IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Political Business Cycles and Inflation Stabilization

When the choice of the nominal anchor and timing of inflation stabilization is analyzed with models of political business cycles, there is room for political opportunism of policymakers. The different business cycles associated with exchange rate-based (ERBS) and money-based stabilizations (MBS) imply that the decision regarding the timing and nominal anchor of stabilization may be affected by the timing of elections. Namely, an opportunistic policymaker is more likely to implement an ERBS than a MBS before elections, while the opposite happens after elections. Empirical results obtained when estimating a multinomial logit model for a sample of 35 stabilization programs implemented in chronic inflation countries clearly support this hypothesis.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/docs/2002/NIPE_WP_9_2002.PDF
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by NIPE - Universidade do Minho in its series NIPE Working Papers with number 9/2002.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nip:nipewp:9/2002
Contact details of provider: Postal: Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas, Escola de Economia e Gestão, Universidade do Minho, P-4710-057 Braga, Portugal
Phone: +351-253604510 ext 5532
Fax: +351-253601380
Web page: http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/versao_inglesa/index_uk.htm
Email:


More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Rebelo, Sérgio, 1995. "Real Effects of Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization: An Analysis of Competing Theories," CEPR Discussion Papers 1220, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Carlos A. Végh Gramont & Alexander W. Hoffmaister, 1995. "Disinflation and the Recession-Now-Versus-Recession-Later Hypothesis; Evidence From Uruguay," IMF Working Papers 95/99, International Monetary Fund.
  3. A. Javier Hamann, 1999. "Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization; Acritical Look At the Stylized Facts," IMF Working Papers 99/132, International Monetary Fund.
  4. Ari Aisen, 2004. "Money-Based Versus Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization; Is there Space for Political Opportunism?," IMF Working Papers 04/94, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Cukierman, Alex & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "The Politics of Ambiguity," Scholarly Articles 4552530, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  6. Kiguel, Miguel A & Liviatan, Nissan, 1992. "The Business Cycle Associated.with Exchange Rate-Based Stabilizations," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(2), pages 279-305, May.
  7. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1993. "Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 27-42, March.
  8. Francisco José Veiga, 2000. "Delays of Inflation Stabilizations," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 275-295, November.
  9. Guillermo A. Calvo & Carlos A. Vegh, 1999. "Inflation Stabilization and BOP Crises in Developing Countries," NBER Working Papers 6925, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Thomas J. Sargent, 1982. "The Ends of Four Big Inflations," NBER Chapters, in: Inflation: Causes and Effects, pages 41-98 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. David M. Gould, 1999. "Does the choice of nominal anchor matter?," Center for Latin America Working Papers 0499, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  12. Carlos A. Végh, 1992. "Stopping High Inflation: An Analytical Overview," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 39(3), pages 626-695, September.
  13. Rogoff, Kenneth & Sibert, Anne, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16, January.
  14. Ernesto H. Stein & Jorge M. Streb, 1997. "Political Stabilization Cycles in High Inflation Economies," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 123, Universidad del CEMA.
  15. Stanley Fischer & Ratna Sahay & Carlos A. V�gh, 2002. "Modern Hyper- and High Inflations," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(3), pages 837-880, September.
  16. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April.
  17. Kiguel, Miguel A. & Liviatan, Nissan, 1988. "Inflationary rigidities and stabilization policies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4, The World Bank.
  18. Stanley Fischer & Ratna Sahay & Carlos A. Végh Gramont, 2002. "Modern Hyper- and High Inflations," IMF Working Papers 02/197, International Monetary Fund.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nip:nipewp:9/2002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Maria João Thompson)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.