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Does IMF Support Accelerate Inflation Stabilization?

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  • Francisco Joséveiga

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) arrangements on the timing of inflation stabilization programs. By providing financial support that may allow the reduction of inflation without incurring politically unacceptable economic costs, the IMF can hasten stabilization. But, since support can also reduce the costs of inflation, it may instead delay it. Empirical results obtained for 10 countries that suffered from chronic inflation fail to support the hypothesis that IMF financial assistance accelerates stabilization. Rather, they indicate that other factors have a greater impact on the timing of stabilizations: greater fragmentation of the political system delays stabilization, while a higher level of inflation hastens it. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco Joséveiga, 2005. "Does IMF Support Accelerate Inflation Stabilization?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 321-340, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:16:y:2005:i:4:p:321-340
    DOI: 10.1007/s11079-005-4738-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Calvo, Guillermo A. & Vegh, Carlos A., 1999. "Inflation stabilization and bop crises in developing countries," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 24, pages 1531-1614, Elsevier.
    2. Francisco José Veiga, 2000. "Delays of Inflation Stabilizations," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 275-295, November.
    3. Joyce, Joseph P., 1992. "The economic characteristics of IMF program countries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 237-242, February.
    4. Drazen, Allan & Grilli, Vittorio, 1993. "The Benefit of Crises for Economic Reforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 598-607, June.
    5. Castro, Vitor & Veiga, Francisco Jose, 2004. "Political business cycles and inflation stabilization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 1-6, April.
    6. Michael Bruno & Guido Di Tella & Rudiger Dornbusch & Stanley Fischer, 1988. "Inflation Stabilization: The Experience of Israel, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Mexico," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262022796, December.
    7. Dreher, Axel, 2006. "IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 769-788, May.
    8. Michael Mussa & Miguel Savastano, 2000. "The IMF Approach to Economic Stabilization," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1999, Volume 14, pages 79-128, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Bird, Graham & Hussain, Mumtaz & Joyce, Joseph P., 2004. "Many happy returns? Recidivism and the IMF," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 231-251, March.
    10. Knight, Malcolm & Santaella, Julio A., 1997. "Economic determinants of IMF financial arrangements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 405-436, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Moser & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2011. "Explaining IMF lending decisions after the Cold War," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 307-340, September.
    2. Francisco Jose Veiga, 2008. "Why do stabilizations fail?," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 135-149.
    3. Axel Dreher, 2009. "IMF conditionality: theory and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 233-267, October.

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