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Delays of Inflation Stabilizations

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  • Francisco José Veiga

Abstract

In some new political economic models, delays of stabilizations result from coordination problems caused by collective choice‐making mechanisms. Although several previous studies have tested the effects of political instability and fragmentation on seigniorage, deficits, or inflation, no direct tests of the influence of these factors on the delays of stabilizations have previously been undertaken. This paper reports the results of such tests. The degree of fragmentation of the political system and the level of inflation are identified as important determinants of the timing of inflation stabilizations.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco José Veiga, 2000. "Delays of Inflation Stabilizations," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 275-295, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:3:p:275-295
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00078
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Francisco Joséveiga, 2005. "Does IMF Support Accelerate Inflation Stabilization?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 321-340, October.
    2. Bittencourt, Manoel, 2010. "Democracy, Populism and Hyperinflation[s]: Evidence from Latin America," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Hannover 2010 47, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
    3. Keefer, Philip & Knack, Stephen, 2002. "Social polarization, social institutions, and country creditworthiness," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2920, The World Bank.
    4. Mustafa Ismihan & Aysit Tansel & Kivilcim Metin-Ozcan, 2002. "Macroeconomic Instability, Capital Accumulation and Growth : The Case of Turkey 1963-1999," Working Papers 0205, Department of Economics, Bilkent University.
    5. Mr. A. J Hamann & Mr. Alessandro Prati, 2002. "Why Do Many Disinflations Fail? the Importance of Luck, Timing, and Political Institutions," IMF Working Papers 2002/228, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Alberto Alesina & Silvia Ardagna & Francesco Trebbi, 2006. "Who Adjusts and When?The Political Economy of Reforms," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 53(si), pages 1-1.
    7. Brousseau, Eric & Garrouste, Pierre & Raynaud, Emmanuel, 2011. "Institutional changes: Alternative theories and consequences for institutional design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1-2), pages 3-19, June.
    8. Avi Ben-Bassat, 2011. "Conflicts, Interest Groups, and Politics in Structural Reforms," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(4), pages 937-952.
    9. Castro, Vitor & Veiga, Francisco Jose, 2004. "Political business cycles and inflation stabilization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 1-6, April.
    10. Francesco Di Comite & Thomas Lambert, 2020. "Reforming Finance Under Fragmented Governments," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 62(1), pages 105-148, March.
    11. Hans Pitlik, 2005. "Are Less Constrained Governments Really More Successful in Executing Market-oriented Policy Changes," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 255/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
    12. Francisco José Veiga, 2002. "IMF arrangements, politics and the timing of stabilizations," NIPE Working Papers 2/2002, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    13. Francisco Jose Veiga, 2008. "Why do stabilizations fail?," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 135-149.
    14. Vítor Castro, 2003. "The Impact of Conflicts of Interest on Inflation Stabilization," NIPE Working Papers 8/2003, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    15. Ari Aisen & Francisco José Veiga, 2003. "Does Political Instability lead to higher and more volatile inflation? A Panel Data Analysis," NIPE Working Papers 10/2003, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    16. Francisco José Veiga, 2003. "The Political Economy of Failed Stabilization," NIPE Working Papers 13/2003, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    17. Manoel Bittencourt, 2012. "Democracy, populism and hyperinflation: some evidence from Latin America," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 311-332, December.

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