Elections and Governments` Behaviour - An Application to Portuguese Municipalities
Governments have an important role at defining the course of the economy. It is crucial, therefore, to understand their behaviour, their motivations and the factors underlying their policies, once the economy evolution can not be dissociated from the institutional and political background. This paper tests the relation between the economy and politics at the local administration level. Specifically, using a Portuguese municipalities`panel dataset, it tests opportunistics and partisan behaviour of local governments, either on instruments of local economic policy or on local economic outcomes. The main findings are: (i) local governments adopt an opportunistics behaviour, observed both on instruments and outcomes; and (ii) there is no evidence of partisan behaviour whatsoever. These results lead to important issues at light of the Stability and Growth Pact requirements.
|Date of creation:||2004|
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