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Policy Motivation and Party Differences in a Dynamic Spatial Model of Party Competition

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  • Chappell, Henry W.
  • Keech, William R.

Abstract

We present a model of party competition that produces more realistic patterns of results than those often emphasized in the literature. Reversing Downs (1957), we assume that parties win elections in order to formulate policies, rather than formulate policies in order to win elections. Voters are modeled first as having perfect information about candidate positions, and then under conditions of uncertainty. In simulation experiments we show that policy motivation and voter uncertainty can bring about persistent and predictable party differences in sequential majority rule elections. As the degree of voter certainty decreases, parties diverge towards their optima, whereas increases in voter certainty draw parties towards cycles in which party positions vary, but predictable issue stances are maintained on the average.

Suggested Citation

  • Chappell, Henry W. & Keech, William R., 1986. "Policy Motivation and Party Differences in a Dynamic Spatial Model of Party Competition," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(3), pages 881-899, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:80:y:1986:i:03:p:881-899_18
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    Cited by:

    1. David A. Green & Kathryn Harrison, 2010. "Minimum wage setting and standards of fairness," IFS Working Papers W10/09, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    2. Grier, Robin M & Grier, Kevin B, 2000. "Political Cycles in Nontraditional Settings: Theory and Evidence from the Case of Mexico," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 239-263, April.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Spear, Stephen E., 1988. "An overlapping generations model of electoral competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 359-379, December.
    4. Jane Green, 2007. "When Voters and Parties Agree: Valence Issues and Party Competition," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 55(3), pages 629-655, October.
    5. Cesar Alberto Campos Coelho, 2004. "Elections and Governments` Behaviour - An Application to Portuguese Municipalities," NIPE Working Papers 8/2004, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    6. Caporale, Tony & Grier, Kevin B, 1998. "A Political Model of Monetary Policy with Application to the Real Fed Funds Rate," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 409-428, October.
    7. Jan Rovny, 2012. "Who emphasizes and who blurs? Party strategies in multidimensional competition," European Union Politics, , vol. 13(2), pages 269-292, June.
    8. Goodell, John W. & Vähämaa, Sami, 2013. "US presidential elections and implied volatility: The role of political uncertainty," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 1108-1117.
    9. Jin, Cheng & Li, Yifu & Jin, Xiaogang, 2017. "Political opinion formation: Initial opinion distribution and individual heterogeneity of tolerance," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 467(C), pages 257-266.
    10. Caporale, Tony, 1998. "The impact of monetary regime changes: Some exchange rate evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 85-94, March.
    11. Cameron Shelton, 2012. "The information content of elections and varieties of the partisan political business cycle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 209-240, January.
    12. Stuart Elaine Macdonald & George Rabinowitz, 1993. "Direction and Uncertainty in a Model of Issue Voting," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 61-87, January.

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