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Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power

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Cited by:

  1. Paan Jindapon & Christopher Whaley, 2015. "Risk lovers and the rent over-investment puzzle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 87-101, July.
  2. Paul Pecorino, 2016. "Individual welfare and the group size paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(1), pages 137-152, July.
  3. David N. Laband & John P. Sophocleus, 2019. "Measuring rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 49-69, October.
  4. Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 63-82, January.
  5. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016. "Where are the rent seekers?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 124-141, June.
  6. Price, Curtis R. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2011. "Endowment effects in contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(3), pages 217-219, June.
  7. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2011. "Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 27, pages 5-32.
  8. Roman Sheremeta & Jingjing Zhang, 2010. "Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(2), pages 175-197, July.
  9. Bös, Dieter, 2002. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 27/2002, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
  10. Curtis R. Price & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2015. "Endowment Origin, Demographic Effects, and Individual Preferences in Contests," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(3), pages 597-619, September.
  11. Dieter Bös, 2002. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," CESifo Working Paper Series 807, CESifo.
  12. Mago, Shakun D. & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Yates, Andrew, 2013. "Best-of-three contest experiments: Strategic versus psychological momentum," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 287-296.
  13. Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2015. "Institutional dynamics under revenue volatility and revenue-dependent lobbying power: A stochastic differential game approach," DEM Discussion Paper Series 15-08, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
  14. Temel, Tugrul, 2011. "Industrial policy, collective action, and the direction of technological change," MPRA Paper 31917, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Pierre Fauvet & Sébastien Rouillon, 2016. "Would you trust lobbies?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(3), pages 201-219, June.
  16. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2012. "Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 247-275, October.
  17. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2012. "Loss Aversion in Contests," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1204, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  18. Jari Eloranta, 2009. "Rent seeking and collusion in the military allocation decisions of Finland, Sweden, and Great Britain, 1920–381," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 62(1), pages 23-44, February.
  19. Edward Millner & Michael Pratt, 1989. "An experimental investigation of efficient rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 139-151, August.
  20. Hiroyuki Sano, 2014. "Reciprocal rent-seeking contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(3), pages 575-596, March.
  21. Nicolas Treich, 2010. "Risk-aversion and prudence in rent-seeking games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 339-349, December.
  22. Tarr, David, 1991. "When does rent-seeking augment the benefits of price and trade reform on rationed commodities? : estimates for automobiles and color televisions in Poland," Policy Research Working Paper Series 741, The World Bank.
  23. March, Christoph & Sahm, Marco, 2018. "Contests as selection mechanisms: The impact of risk aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 114-131.
  24. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1986. "Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 175-181, January.
  25. Robert Michaels, 1988. "The design of rent-seeking competitions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 17-29, January.
  26. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2013. "Overbidding And Heterogeneous Behavior In Contest Experiments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 491-514, July.
  27. Cason, Timothy N. & Masters, William A. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2020. "Winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: Theory and experimental results," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 314-327.
  28. Schwarz Mordechai E., 2012. "Subgame Perfect Plea Bargaining in Biform Judicial Contests," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 297-330, September.
  29. Jean-Daniel Guigou & Bruno Lovat & Nicolas Treich, 2017. "Risky rents," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 151-164, October.
  30. Emanuela Lezzi & Piers Fleming & Daniel John Zizzo, 2015. "Does it matter which effort task you use? A comparison of four effort tasks when agents compete for a prize," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 15-05, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  31. Sheremeta, Roman M., 2010. "Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 731-747, March.
  32. Van Long, Ngo, 2013. "The theory of contests: A unified model and review of the literature," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 161-181.
  33. Luis Corchón, 2007. "The theory of contests: a survey," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(2), pages 69-100, September.
  34. Lisa Anderson & Beth Freeborn, 2010. "Varying the intensity of competition in a multiple prize rent seeking experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(1), pages 237-254, April.
  35. Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2015. "Symmetric vs Asymmetric Equilibria and Stochastic Stability in a Dynamic Game of Legislative Lobbying," AMSE Working Papers 1531, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Jan 2018.
  36. Euan Fleming, 1998. "Rent-seeking in rural development projects: its potential causes and measures to reduce its costs," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(3), pages 277-299.
  37. Shupp, Robert & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Schmidt, David & Walker, James, 2013. "Resource allocation contests: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 257-267.
  38. Yuk Ying Chang & Martin Young, 2015. "Dissipative Competition: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 15(2), pages 169-198, June.
  39. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2011. "Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(2), pages 573-590, April.
  40. Gradstein, Mark, 1998. "Optimal contest design: volume and timing of rent seeking in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 575-585, November.
  41. Marco Sahm, 2017. "Risk Aversion and Prudence in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 6417, CESifo.
  42. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  43. De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2018. "The adverse consequences of tournaments: Evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 1-18.
  44. Martin Grossmann, 2021. "Asymmetric Opportunities After an Unsuccessful Sports Career," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 22(5), pages 587-612, June.
  45. Gustafsson, Anders & Gustavsson Tingvall, Patrik & Halvarsson, Daniel, 2017. "Subsidy Entrepreneurs," Ratio Working Papers 303, The Ratio Institute.
  46. Jack Hirshleifer, 1988. "Conflict and Rent-Seeking: Ratio Vs. Difference Models," UCLA Economics Working Papers 491, UCLA Department of Economics.
  47. Münster, Johannes, 2006. "Contests with Investment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 120, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  48. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Turocy, Theodore L., 2014. "Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 224-238.
  49. Daniel Houser & Thomas Stratmann, 2012. "Gordon Tullock and experimental economics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 211-222, July.
  50. Cadsby, C. Bram & Song, Fei & Engle-Warnick, Jim & Fang, Tony, 2019. "Invoking social comparison to improve performance by ranking employees: The moderating effects of public ranking, rank pay, and individual risk attitude," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 64-79.
  51. Sheremeta, Roman, 2016. "Impulsive Behavior in Competition: Testing Theories of Overbidding in Rent-Seeking Contests," MPRA Paper 73731, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  52. Wang Zhewei, 2010. "The Optimal Accuracy Level in Asymmetric Contests," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-18, April.
  53. Mago, Shakun D. & Razzolini, Laura, 2019. "Best-of-five contest: An experiment on gender differences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 164-187.
  54. László Csorba, 2019. "Issues and Types of Adverse Selection and Negative Selection," Financial and Economic Review, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), vol. 18(2), pages 87-116.
  55. Dickson, Alex & MacKenzie, Ian A. & Sekeris, Petros G., 2018. "Rent-seeking incentives in share contests," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 53-62.
  56. Richard Higgins & William Shughart & Robert Tollison, 1985. "Efficient rents 2 free entry and efficient rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 247-258, January.
  57. Fabella, Raul V., 1995. "The social cost of rent seeking under countervailing opposition to distortionary transfers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 235-247, June.
  58. David Bruner & Caleb Cox & David M. McEvoy & Brock Stoddard, 2019. "Strategic Thinking in Contests," Working Papers 19-08, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
  59. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
  60. Aidt, Toke S. & Hillman, Arye L., 2008. "Enduring rents," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 545-553, September.
  61. Bullock, David S. & Rutstrom, Elisabet E., 2001. "The Size Of The Prize: Testing Rent-Dissipation When Transfer Quantity Is Endogenous," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20447, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  62. R Cornes & R Hartley, 2005. "The Geometry of Aggregative Games," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0514, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  63. Jac C. Heckelman, 2017. "Tullock on the organization of scientific inquiry," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 1-17, March.
  64. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
  65. Raoul Bouccekine & Fabien Prieur & Weihua Ruan & Benteng Zou, 2021. "Uncertainty-driven symmetry-breaking and stochastic stability in a generic differential game of lobbying," DEM Discussion Paper Series 21-10, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
  66. Kyung Hwan Baik & Dongryul Lee, 2012. "Do Rent‐Seeking Groups Announce Their Sharing Rules?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 348-363, April.
  67. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Lee, Sanghack, 2001. "Strategic Groups and Rent Dissipation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(4), pages 672-684, October.
  68. Sebagh Thierry, 1995. "Recherche De Rente : Jeu de Guerre et Guerre D'enjeux - II," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2-3), pages 1-20, June.
  69. Sheremeta, Roman, 2009. "Essays on Experimental Investigation of Lottery Contests," MPRA Paper 49888, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  70. Johannes Münster, 2006. "Contests with an unknown number of contestants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 353-368, December.
  71. Mahmudul Anam & Eliakim Katz, 1988. "Rent-seeking and second best economics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 215-224, December.
  72. Patrick A. McLaughlin & Adam C. Smith & Russell S. Sobel, 2019. "Bootleggers, Baptists, and the risks of rent seeking," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 211-234, June.
  73. Alex Dickson & Ian A MacKenzie & Petros Sekeris, 2016. "Contests with general preferences," Working Papers 1608, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
  74. Tina Søreide, 2006. "Business corruption, uncertainty and risk aversion," CMI Working Papers WP 2006: 4, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
  75. Eliakim Katz & J. Smith, 1988. "Rent-seeking and optimal regulation in replenishable resource industries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 25-36, October.
  76. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-1534, November.
  77. Münster, Johannes, 2006. "Contests with investment [Wettkämpfe mit Investitionen]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-09, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  78. Mordechai E. Schwarz, 2020. "A Master of Two Servants: The Effect of Separation of Powers on Public Accountability and Social Welfare," Proceedings of International Academic Conferences 10612466, International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences.
  79. Michael Beenstock, 1989. "A democratic model of the “rent-sought” benefit cycle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 1-14, October.
  80. Dieter Bös, 2004. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(3_4), pages 359-380, June.
  81. Coggins, Jay S., 1992. "Rent Dissipation and the Social Cost of Price Policy," Staff Papers 200551, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
  82. Leonid Polishchuk & Alexander Tonis, 2013. "Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 271-297, January.
  83. Joshua Hall & Josh Matti & Amir B. Ferreira Neto, 2019. "Rent-seeking in the classroom and textbooks: Where are we after 50 years?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 71-82, October.
  84. Coggins, Jay S., 1992. "Rent Dissipation And The Social Cost Of Price Policy," 1992 Annual Meeting, August 9-12, Baltimore, Maryland 271378, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  85. Johannes Münster, 2007. "Contests with investment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(8), pages 849-862.
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