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Durable Constitutional Rules and Rent Seeking

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  • Daniel Sutter

Abstract

Many constitutional political economists argue that the length of time constitutions remain in effect distinguishes constitutional politics from legislative politics. The author explores the role of constitutional durability in a repeated rent-seeking game. A general interest (e.g., consumers) in the game can lobby for a constitutional prohibition that prevents the rent-seeking contest from occurring. A durable constitution can reduce expected rent-seeking expenditures if constitutional politics occurs less frequently than legislative politics, stable rights to receive rents do not exist, and the general interest has a longer time horizon than rent seekers. Under these conditions, general interest lobbying for a constitutional prohibition denies transfers to future rent seekers unable to participate in politics today.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Sutter, 2003. "Durable Constitutional Rules and Rent Seeking," Public Finance Review, , vol. 31(4), pages 413-428, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:31:y:2003:i:4:p:413-428
    DOI: 10.1177/1091142103031004004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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