Rent-seeking in rural development projects: its potential causes and measures to reduce its costs
Projects are a potential source of considerable rent-seeking which detracts from their contributions to rural development. It is the purpose of this paper to out-line the nature of the problems caused by rent-seeking in projects in developing countries, and to identify those situations in which rent-seeking is more likely to be prevalent. Factors influencing susceptibility to rent-seeking are categorized according to whether they are exogenous or endogenous to a particular project. Endogenous factors are decomposed into those embodied in planning and management processes, project attributes or attributes of beneficiaries. This identification provides a platform for suggesting ways of minimizing rent-seeking in rural development projects. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Volume (Year): 10 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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