IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/cup/cbooks/9780521031325.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Politics by Principle, Not Interest

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Heshmati Almas & Karlson Nils & Box Marcus, 2013. "Generality, State Neutrality and Unemployment in the OECD," Global Economy Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3-4), pages 333-358, December.
  2. Christopher Coyne & Lotta Moberg, 2015. "The political economy of state-provided targeted benefits," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 28(3), pages 337-356, September.
  3. Meina Cai & Ilia Murtazashvili & Jennifer Murtazashvili & Raufhon Salahodjaev, 2020. "Individualism and governance of the commons," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(1), pages 175-195, July.
  4. Roger D. Congleton, 2002. "Risk-Averse Taxpayers and the Allocation of Tax Enforcement Effort: Law Enforcement or Leviathan? Some Empirical Evidence," Public Finance Review, , vol. 30(5), pages 456-476, September.
  5. Georg Vanberg & Viktor Vanberg, 2012. "Towards a (re-)integration of the social sciences: The Calculus of Consent at 50," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 245-252, September.
  6. repec:elg:eechap:15325_13 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Roger Congleton, 2014. "The contractarian constitutional political economy of James Buchanan," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 39-67, March.
  8. Bennett, Daniel & Nikolaev, Boris & Aidt, Toke, 2016. "Institutions & Well-being," MPRA Paper 78436, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Andrew T. Young, 2015. "Hospitalitas," Working Papers 15-41, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  10. Marcin Kalinowski, 2012. "Decentralization of political structure from the point of view of New Political Economy," Ekonomia i Prawo, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 8(1), pages 13-26, March.
  11. Lars Feld, 2014. "James Buchanan’s theory of federalism: from fiscal equity to the ideal political order," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 231-252, September.
  12. Borella, Sara, 2005. "Political reform from a constitutional economics perspective: a hurdle-race. The case of migration politics in Germany," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 05/7, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
  13. Manuel Woersdoerfer, 2023. "AI Ethics and Ordoliberalism 2.0: Towards A 'Digital Bill of Rights'," Papers 2311.10742, arXiv.org.
  14. Congleton, Roger D. & Tollison, Robert D., 1999. "The stability inducing propensities of very unstable coalitions: avoiding the downward spiral of majoritarian rent-seeking," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 193-205, June.
  15. Friedrich Schneider, 2013. "James M. Buchanan and the European Public Choice Movement: What Did We Learn from Him?," Economics working papers 2013-24, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
  16. Munger Michael C., 2012. "Basic Income Is Not an Obligation, But It Might Be a Legitimate Choice," Basic Income Studies, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 1-13, January.
  17. Phillip W. Magness, 2020. "The anti-discriminatory tradition in Virginia school public choice theory," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 417-441, June.
  18. Berggren, Niclas & Nilsson, Therese, 2016. "Tolerance in the United States: Does economic freedom transform racial, religious, political and sexual attitudes?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(S), pages 53-70.
  19. Shruti Rajagopalan & Richard Wagner, 2013. "Constitutional craftsmanship and the rule of law," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 295-309, December.
  20. Niclas Berggren, 1999. "A Preference-Utilitarian Foundation for the Generality Principle," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 339-353, November.
  21. Gutmann, Jerg & Voigt, Stefan, 2018. "The rule of law: Measurement and deep roots," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 68-82.
  22. Paulo Pereira, 2000. "From Schumpeterian Democracy to Constitutional Democracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 69-86, March.
  23. Jamie Bologna Pavlik & Andrew T. Young, 2020. "Medieval European traditions in representation and state capacity today," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 133-186, June.
  24. Mario J. Rizzo & Malte F. Dold, 2020. "Can a contractarian be a paternalist? The logic of James M. Buchanan’s system," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 495-507, June.
  25. Åsbjørn Melkevik, 2016. "No progressive taxation without discrimination? On the generality of the law in the classical liberal tradition," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 418-434, December.
  26. Tridimas, George & Winer, Stanley L., 2005. "The political economy of government size," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 643-666, September.
  27. Wohlgemuth Michael, 2008. "50 Jahre Europäische Ordnungspolitik: ordnungs- und konstitutionenökonomische Anmerkungen / 50 years of European „Ordnungspolitik”, remarks from a constitutional economics perspective," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 59(1), pages 381-404, January.
  28. Roger Congleton, 2013. "On the inevitability of divided government and improbability of a complete separation of powers," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 177-198, September.
  29. Young, Andrew T., 2018. "Hospitalitas: Barbarian settlements and constitutional foundations of medieval Europe," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(4), pages 715-737, August.
  30. Geoffrey Brennan, 2005. "“The Myth of Ownership” Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 207-219, June.
  31. Randall G. Holcombe, 2018. "Checks and Balances: Enforcing Constitutional Constraints," Economies, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-12, October.
  32. Roger Congleton, 2011. "Why local governments do not maximize profits: on the value added by the representative institutions of town and city governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(1), pages 187-207, October.
  33. Gustavo Nunes Mourão & Eduardo Angeli, 2022. "A classification of the methodology of James M. Buchanan from a multidisciplinary perspective," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 413-432, December.
  34. Mario J. Rizzo, 2021. "Abstract rules for complex systems," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 209-227, December.
  35. Peter J. Boettke & Henry A. Thompson, 2022. "Identity and off-diagonals: how permanent winning coalitions destroy democratic governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(3), pages 483-499, June.
  36. Alexander William Salter, 2016. "Political Property Rights and Governance Outcomes: A Theory of the Corporate Polity," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(Winter 20), pages 1-20.
  37. James Buchanan, 2005. "Afraid to be free: Dependency as desideratum," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 19-31, July.
  38. Vanberg Viktor J., 2014. "Liberalismus und Demokratie: Zu einer vernachlässigten Seite der liberalen Denktradition," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 345-374, January.
  39. Vanberg, Viktor J., 2005. "Market and state: the perspective of constitutional political economy," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 23-49, June.
  40. Vanberg, Viktor J., 2006. "On the Complementarity of Liberalism and Democracy," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 06/9, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
  41. Coyne, Christopher J., 2011. "Constitutions and crisis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 351-357.
  42. Horn, Karen, 2011. "James M. Buchanan – Doing away with discrimination and domination," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 358-366.
  43. Wohlgemuth, Michael, 2007. "Learning through institutional competition," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 07/9, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
  44. Randall G. Holcombe, 2020. "James M. Buchanan’s constitutional project: past and future," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 371-387, June.
  45. Feld, Lars P. & Nientiedt, Daniel, 2022. "Hayekian economic policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 204(C), pages 457-465.
  46. Stefan Voigt, 2006. "Robust political economy: The case of antitrust," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 19(2), pages 203-215, June.
  47. Vlad Tarko, 2017. "Neoliberalism and Regulatory Capitalism: Understanding the "Freer Markets More Rules" Puzzle," Working Paper Series 2017-02, Dickinson College, Department of Economics.
  48. Otto Lehto & John Meadowcroft, 2021. "Welfare without rent seeking? Buchanan’s demogrant proposal and the possibility of a constitutional welfare state," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 145-164, June.
  49. Niclas Berggren, 2012. "The Calculus of Consent: some Swedish connections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 313-321, September.
  50. Matthew D. Mitchell, 2019. "Uncontestable favoritism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 167-190, October.
  51. Vlad Tarko, 2021. "Simple rules for a more inclusive economy," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 229-249, December.
  52. Berggren, Niclas & Karlson, Nils, 2003. "Constitutionalism, Division of Power and Transaction Costs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(1-2), pages 99-124, October.
  53. Vanberg, Viktor J., 2014. "Liberalismus und Demokratie: Zu einer vernachlässigten Seite der liberalen Denktradition," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 14/04, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
  54. Klump Rainer & Wörsdörfer Manuel, 2015. "Paternalistic Economic Policies: Foundations, Implications and Critical Evaluations," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 66(1), pages 27-60, January.
  55. Andrej Angelovski & Arianna Galliera & Werner Güth, 2019. "Partial Versus General Compulsory Solidarity: an Experimental Analysis," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 249-279, December.
  56. Niclas Berggren, 2009. "Choosing one’s own informal institutions: on Hayek’s critique of Keynes’s immoralism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 139-159, June.
  57. Stanley L. Winer, 2016. "The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution," Carleton Economic Papers 16-15, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
  58. Müller Christian, 1999. "Brauchen wir einen Schleier der Unkenntnis?," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 50(1), pages 207-232, January.
  59. Stanley L. Winer & George Tridimas & Walter Hettich, 2008. "Social Welfare and Coercion in Public Finance," CESifo Working Paper Series 2482, CESifo.
  60. Alexander William Salter & Andrew T. Young, 2018. "Medieval representative assemblies: collective action and antecedents of limited government," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 171-192, June.
  61. Richard E. Wagner, 2012. "Deficits, Debt, and Democracy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14477.
  62. Hartmut Kliemt, 2012. "The consents of The Calculus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 439-443, September.
  63. Nicolás Cachanosky & Edward J. Lopez, 2020. "Rediscovering Buchanan’s rediscovery: non-market exchange versus antiseptic allocation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 461-477, June.
  64. Joshua R. Hendrickson & Alexander William Salter, 2020. "Options To The Realm: A Cost Neutral Proposal To Improve Political Incentives," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(3), pages 515-529, July.
  65. Mikayla Novak, 2021. "Social innovation and Austrian economics: Exploring the gains from intellectual trade," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 34(1), pages 129-147, March.
  66. James M. Buchanan, 2003. "Politics as Tragedy in Several Acts," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 181-191, July.
  67. Niclas Berggren & Jerg Gutmann, 2020. "Securing personal freedom through institutions: the role of electoral democracy and judicial independence," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 165-186, April.
  68. Kappius, Robert, 2011. "Equal opportunity in educational contexts: Comparing the feasibility of divergent conceptualizations," The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 02-2011, University of Freiburg, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory.
  69. Paul Dragos Aligica & Vlad Tarko, 2015. "Crony Capitalism," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(03), pages 27-32, October.
  70. Paul Dragos Aligica & Vlad Tarko, 2015. "Crony Capitalism," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(3), pages 27-32, October.
  71. Bavetta, Sebastiano & Li Donni, Paolo & Marino, Maria, 2020. "How consistent are perceptions of inequality?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
  72. Alexandra Oprea, 2019. "Democracy as a Game of Trust: The Limits of Generality Constraints," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 227-248, December.
  73. Andrew T. Young, 2019. "How Austrians can contribute to constitutional political economy (and why they should)," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(4), pages 281-293, December.
  74. Gregory W. Caskey & Ilia Murtazashvili, 2022. "The predatory state and coercive assimilation: The case of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 217-235, April.
  75. Niclas Berggren & Christian Bjørnskov & Therese Nilsson, 2017. "What Aspects of Society Matter for the Quality of Life of a Minority? Global Evidence from the New Gay Happiness Index," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 1163-1192, July.
  76. Christopher S. Martin & Nikolai G. Wenzel, 2020. "Generality and knowledge: Hayek's constitutional theory of the liberal state," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 145-168, June.
  77. Vlad Tarko, 2015. "The role of ideas in political economy," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 28(1), pages 17-39, March.
  78. Geoffrey Lea & Adam Martin, 2014. "From Vienna to Virginia: Exchange, rules, and social cooperation an introduction to the symposium," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 1-9, March.
  79. Stanley L. Winer & George Tridimas & Walter Hettich, 2007. "Social Welfare and Collective Goods Coercion in Public Economics," Carleton Economic Papers 07-03, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
  80. Vanberg Viktor J., 2013. "James M. Buchanan (1919-2013)," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 64(1), pages 11-24, January.
  81. Roger D. Congleton, 2020. "Governance by true believers: supreme duties with and without totalitarianism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 111-141, March.
  82. Dennis Mueller, 2012. "James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and The Calculus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 329-332, September.
  83. Berggren, Niclas & Nilsson, Therese & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2015. "What Aspects of Society Affect the Quality of Life of a Minority? Global Evidence from the New Gay Happiness Index," Working Paper Series 1101, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  84. Michael C. Munger, 2022. "Giants among us: do we need a new antitrust paradigm?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 445-460, December.
  85. Roger Congleton & Andreas Kyriacou & Jordi Bacaria, 2003. "A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 167-190, September.
  86. Pietro Navarra & Giuseppe Sobbrio, 2001. "Election Re-Running and the Nature of Constitutional Choices: The Case of Italian Electoral Reform," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 31-50, March.
  87. Roger Congleton, 2010. "Thoughts on Daniel Shapiro's “Is the welfare state justified?”," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 23(1), pages 103-105, March.
  88. Daniele Bertolini, 2019. "Constitutionalizing Leviathan: A Critique of Buchanan’s Conception of Lawmaking," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 41-69, October.
  89. Andrew Young, 2022. "The Peace of God," Rationality and Society, , vol. 34(1), pages 28-55, February.
  90. Nisticò, Roberto, 2022. "Political institutions and economic development over more than a century," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 199-215.
  91. Vanberg, Georg, 2011. "Substance vs. procedure: Constitutional enforcement and constitutional choice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 309-318.
  92. T. Durant, 2011. "Making executive politics mutually productive and fair," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 141-172, June.
  93. Sabau, Gabriela L., 2010. "Know, live and let live: Towards a redefinition of the knowledge-based economy -- sustainable development nexus," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(6), pages 1193-1201, April.
  94. Niclas Berggren, 2000. "Implementing Generality while Reducing the Risk for Fiscal Explosion," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 353-369, December.
  95. Charles Rowley, 2012. "The intellectual legacy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 29-46, July.
  96. Berggren, Niclas & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2020. "Corruption, judicial accountability and inequality: Unfair procedures may benefit the worst-off," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 341-354.
  97. Young, Andrew T., 2022. "Consent or coordination? assemblies in early medieval Europe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
  98. Timothy P. Roth, 2014. "Economists and the State," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15078.
  99. Marta Podemska-Mikluch & Darwyyn Deyo & David T. Mitchell, 2016. "Public Choice Lessons from the Wizarding World of Harry Potter," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(Spring 20), pages 57-69.
  100. repec:cpn:umkeip:2012:v1:p:13-26 is not listed on IDEAS
  101. Andrew T. Young, 2021. "The political economy of feudalism in medieval Europe," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 127-143, March.
  102. Pierre Salmon, 2001. "Constitutional Implications of Electoral Assumptions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 333-349, December.
  103. Paul Dragos Aligica & Vlad Tarko, 2014. "Institutional Resilience and Economic Systems: Lessons from Elinor Ostrom’s Work," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 56(1), pages 52-76, March.
  104. repec:ces:ifodic:v:13:y:2015:i:3:p:19172605 is not listed on IDEAS
  105. Justin Callais & Andrew T. Young, 2021. "Does constitutional entrenchment matter for economic freedom?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(4), pages 808-830, October.
  106. Michael Munger, 2005. "Nineteenth-century voting procedures in a twenty-first century world," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 115-133, July.
  107. James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, 2015. "Individualism and Political Disorder," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 16046.
  108. J. Buchanan & Y. Yoon, 2012. "Choosing for others: A neglected element in the theory of collective action," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 9-16, October.
  109. Stanley L. Winer & Walter Hettich, 2002. "The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis when Collective Choice Matters," Carleton Economic Papers 02-11, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 2004.
  110. Martin Leschke, 2000. "Constitutional Choice and Prosperity: A Factor Analysis," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 265-279, September.
  111. John Meadowcroft, 2014. "Exchange, unanimity and consent: a defence of the public choice account of power," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 85-100, January.
  112. Roger D. Congleton, 2022. "Behavioral economics and the Virginia school of political economy: overlaps and complementarities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(3), pages 387-404, June.
  113. Alexander William Salter & Andrew T. Young, 2019. "Polycentric Sovereignty: The Medieval Constitution, Governance Quality, and the Wealth of Nations," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1241-1253, June.
  114. Vlad Tarko & Andrew Farrant, 2019. "The efficiency of regulatory arbitrage," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 141-166, October.
  115. James Buchanan, 2008. "In search of homunculus politicus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(3), pages 469-474, December.
  116. Charles B. Blankart & Gerrit B. Koester, 2007. "The Economic Analysis of Constitutions: Fatalism Versus Vitalism," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 4(2), pages 169-183, May.
  117. Aris Trantidis, 2017. "The problem of constitutional legitimation: what the debate on electoral quotas tells us about the legitimacy of decision-making rules in constitutional choice," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 195-208, June.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.