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Constitutions and crisis

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  • Coyne, Christopher J.

Abstract

A crisis is an unexpected event that creates uncertainty and poses a direct or perceived threat to the goals and norms of an organization or society. While crises are ubiquitous, how societies respond to crises, and the way crises affect societies, is largely a matter of constitutional political economy. Drawing on a variety of insights from James Buchanan's research, this paper develops the political economy of crisis. Focus is placed on understanding: (1) how existing rules influence how societies cope with crises, (2) how crises can affect rules, and (3) the potential for the reform of rules in the wake of crises.

Suggested Citation

  • Coyne, Christopher J., 2011. "Constitutions and crisis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 351-357.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:80:y:2011:i:2:p:351-357
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.05.011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ahmad Rasmi AlBattat & Ahmad Puad Mat Som, 2013. "Emergency Preparedness for Disasters and Crises in the Hotel Industry," SAGE Open, , vol. 3(3), pages 21582440135, September.
    2. Anthony J. Evans & Vlad Tarko, 2014. "Contemporary Work in Austrian Economics," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 29(Fall 2014), pages 135-157.
    3. Petrik Runst, 2014. "Crisis and belief: confirmation bias and the behavioral political economy of recession," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 376-392, December.
    4. Edward Stringham, 2014. "It’s not me, it’s you: the functioning of Wall Street during the 2008 economic downturn," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(3), pages 269-288, December.
    5. Stefanie Haeffele-Balch & Virgil Henry Storr, 2015. "Austrian Contributions to the Literature on Natural and Unnatural Disasters," Advances in Austrian Economics, in: New Thinking in Austrian Political Economy, volume 19, pages 67-93, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    6. Christopher J. Coyne, 2017. "The law and economics of rule reform," Chapters, in: Todd J. Zywicki & Peter J. Boettke (ed.), Research Handbook on Austrian Law and Economics, chapter 5, pages 92-108, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Grossman, Peter Z., 2015. "Energy shocks, crises and the policy process: A review of theory and application," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 56-69.
    8. Dincer, Oguzhan & Gunalp, Burak, 2020. "The effects of federal regulations on corruption in U.S. States," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    9. Glenn L. Furton, 2023. "The pox of politics: Troesken’s tradeoff reexamined," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(1), pages 169-191, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constitution; Crisis; Political economy; Protective state; Productive state; Rules;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General

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