Constitutions and crisis
A crisis is an unexpected event that creates uncertainty and poses a direct or perceived threat to the goals and norms of an organization or society. While crises are ubiquitous, how societies respond to crises, and the way crises affect societies, is largely a matter of constitutional political economy. Drawing on a variety of insights from James Buchanan's research, this paper develops the political economy of crisis. Focus is placed on understanding: (1) how existing rules influence how societies cope with crises, (2) how crises can affect rules, and (3) the potential for the reform of rules in the wake of crises.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 80 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Roger Congleton, 2006. "The story of Katrina: New Orleans and the political economy of catastrophe," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 5-30, April.
- Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
- Christopher J. Coyne & Peter T. Leeson, 2009. "Media, Development, and Institutional Change," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12848, 10.
- Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2000.
"The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India,"
STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers
28, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2002. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1415-1451.
- Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2000. "The political economy of government responsiveness: theory and evidence from India," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 2308, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Besley, Timothy J. & Burgess, Robin, 2001. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," CEPR Discussion Papers 2721, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Keefer, Philip, 2007. "Elections, Special Interests, and Financial Crisis," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(03), pages 607-641, July.
- Scully, Gerald W, 1988. "The Institutional Framework and Economic Development," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 652-62, June.
- Peter T. Leeson & Russell S. Sobel, 2008.
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(4), pages 667-681, November.
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, 2003.
NBER Working Papers
9934, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- William Shughart, 2006. "Katrinanomics: The politics and economics of disaster relief," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 31-53, April.
- Leeson, Peter T., 2007. "Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 689-710, December.
- Emily Chamlee-Wright & Virgil Storr, 2010. "Expectations of government’s response to disaster," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 253-274, July.
- Stephan Haggard, 2000. "Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis, The," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 107, January.
- James M. Buchanan, 2004. "The Status of the Status Quo," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 133-144, 06.
- Holcombe, Randall G, 2002. "Political Entrepreneurship and the Democratic Allocation of Economic Resources," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 15(2-3), pages 143-59, June.
- Easton, Stephen T & Walker, Michael A, 1997. "Income, Growth, and Economic Freedom," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 328-32, May.
- Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?," NBER Working Papers 6564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Peter Boettke & Emily Chamlee-Wright & Peter Gordon & Sanford Ikeda & Peter T. Leeson & Russell Sobel, 2007. "The Political, Economic, and Social Aspects of Katrina," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 363-376, October.
- Matthew E. Kahn, 2005. "The Death Toll from Natural Disasters: The Role of Income, Geography, and Institutions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(2), pages 271-284, May.
- Hausken, Kjell & Plumper, Thomas, 2002. "Containing Contagious Financial Crises: The Political Economy of Joint Intervention into the Asian Crisis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 111(3-4), pages 209-36, June.
- Russell Sobel & Peter Leeson, 2006. "Government's response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 55-73, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:80:y:2011:i:2:p:351-357. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.