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Citations for "Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games"

by Jeffrey C. Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski

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  1. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6102 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Stephen Morris & George J Mailath, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," 2005 Meeting Papers 25, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  3. Laclau, M., 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 136-160.
  4. Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs," KIER Working Papers 597, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  5. Heller, Yuval, 2015. "Instability of Equilibria with Imperfect Private Monitoring," MPRA Paper 64468, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. V Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000170, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Tomala, Tristan, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
  8. repec:spr:compst:v:78:y:2013:i:1:p:77-100 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Sugaya, Takuo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2013. "Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1891-1928.
  10. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
  11. McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2014. "Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 191-212.
  12. Felipe Balmaceda & Juan Esconar, 2013. "Trust in Cohesive Communities," Documentos de Trabajo 295, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  13. Stefano, LOVO, 2007. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information," Les Cahiers de Recherche 884, HEC Paris.
  14. Mitri Kitti, 2013. "Conditional Markov equilibria in discounted dynamic games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 78(1), pages 77-100, August.
  15. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2012. "Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1998-2027.
  16. LOVO, Stefano & HÖRNER, Johanes, 2006. "Belief-free Equilibria in games with incomplete information," Les Cahiers de Recherche 845, HEC Paris.
  17. Francesc Dilmé, 2012. "Cooperation in Large Societies," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  18. Joyee Deb, 2008. "Cooperation and Community Responsibility: A Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games with Names," Working Papers 08-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  19. Damien S Eldridge, 2007. "A Learning Theory of Referrals," Working Papers 2007.06 EDIRC Provider-In, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
  20. Yoo, Seung Han, 2014. "Learning a population distribution," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 188-201.
  21. Łukasz Balbus & Kevin Reffett & Łukasz Woźny, 2013. "Markov Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Supermodular Games with Imperfect Private and Public Information," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 187-206, June.
  22. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Characterizing Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium Payoffs under ConditionalIndependence," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-005, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  23. Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2006. "Private monitoring with infinite histories," Staff Report 383, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  24. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  25. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  26. Fong, Kyna & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2007. "Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8vz4q9tr, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  27. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Aug 2007.
  28. Breitmoser, Yves, 2012. "Cooperation, but no reciprocity: Individual strategies in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," MPRA Paper 41731, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  29. Damien S.Eldridge, 2013. "A shirking theory of referrals," Working Papers 2013.01, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
  30. Josh Cherry & Lones Smith, 2009. "Unattainable Payoffs for Repeated Games of Private Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000284, David K. Levine.
  31. repec:pra:mprapa:64485 is not listed on IDEAS
  32. Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 711-737.
  33. Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan & Hörner, Johannes, 2009. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Les Cahiers de Recherche 921, HEC Paris.
  34. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  35. Joyee Deb & Julio González Díaz & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games," Working Papers 13-16, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  36. Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2012. "Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality," Post-Print hal-00718046, HAL.
  37. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2012. "Restricted feedback in long term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 142-161.
  38. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2009. "A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 802-824, March.
  39. Mailath, George J. & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 174-192, January.
  40. Ichiro Obara, . "Endogenous Monitoring," UCLA Economics Online Papers 398, UCLA Department of Economics.
  41. Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 86-99, May.
  42. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2005. "Robert Aumann's and Thomas Schelling's Contributions to Game Theory: Analyses of Conflict and Cooperation," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2005-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
  43. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:58:p:1-16 is not listed on IDEAS
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