IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login

Citations for "Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games"

by Jeffrey C. Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as in new window

  1. Joyee Deb, 2008. "Cooperation and Community Responsibility: A Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games with Names," Working Papers 08-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  2. Mailath, George J. & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 174-192, January.
  3. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2012. "Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1998-2027.
  4. George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  5. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-004, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  6. Mitri Kitti, 2013. "Conditional Markov equilibria in discounted dynamic games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 78(1), pages 77-100, August.
  7. Damien S Eldridge, 2007. "A Shirking Theory of Referrals," Working Papers 2007.05, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
  8. McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2014. "Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 191-212.
  9. Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2012. "Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 651-669, August.
  10. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from private information in noisy repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1733-1769, September.
  11. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Aug 2007.
  12. Damien S Eldridge, 2007. "A Learning Theory of Referrals," Working Papers 2007.06, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
  13. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  14. Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 711-737.
  15. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Endogeous Monitoring," 2004 Meeting Papers 752, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  16. Łukasz Balbus & Kevin Reffett & Łukasz Woźny, 2013. "Markov Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Supermodular Games with Imperfect Private and Public Information," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 187-206, June.
  17. Laclau, M., 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 136-160.
  18. Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007. "Private Monitoring with Infinite Histories," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 843644000000000079, www.najecon.org.
  19. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  20. Tomala, Tristan, 2009. "Perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6102, Paris Dauphine University.
  21. Tomala, Tristan, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
  22. Felipe Balmaceda & Juan Esconar, 2013. "Trust in Cohesive Communities," Documentos de Trabajo 295, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  23. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Characterizing Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium Payoffs under ConditionalIndependence," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-005, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  24. Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 86-99, May.
  25. Miyagawa, Eiichi & Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2008. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 192-221, March.
  26. Fong, Kyna & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2007. "Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8vz4q9tr, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  27. Yoo, Seung Han, 2014. "Learning a population distribution," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 188-201.
  28. repec:spr:compst:v:78:y:2013:i:1:p:77-100 is not listed on IDEAS
  29. Josh Cherry & Lones Smith, 2009. "Unattainable Payoffs for Repeated Games of Private Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000284, David K. Levine.
  30. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2012. "Restricted feedback in long term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 142-161.
  31. Francesc Dilmé, 2012. "Cooperation in Large Societies," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  32. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
  33. Stefano, LOVO, 2007. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information," Les Cahiers de Recherche 884, HEC Paris.
  34. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2005. "Robert Aumann's and Thomas Schelling's Contributions to Game Theory: Analyses of Conflict and Cooperation," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2005-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
  35. Yves Breitmoser, 2015. "Cooperation, but No Reciprocity: Individual Strategies in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(9), pages 2882-2910, September.
  36. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2009. "A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 802-824, March.
  37. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2007. "Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games," 2007 Meeting Papers 253, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  38. Heller, Yuval, 2015. "Instability of Equilibria with Imperfect Private Monitoring," MPRA Paper 64468, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  39. Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan & Hörner, Johannes, 2009. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Les Cahiers de Recherche 921, HEC Paris.
  40. Joyee Deb & Julio González Díaz & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games," Working Papers 13-16, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  41. repec:pra:mprapa:64485 is not listed on IDEAS
  42. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:58:p:1-16 is not listed on IDEAS
  43. Sugaya, Takuo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2013. "Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1891-1928.
  44. LOVO, Stefano & HÖRNER, Johanes, 2006. "Belief-free Equilibria in games with incomplete information," Les Cahiers de Recherche 845, HEC Paris.
  45. Wojciech Olszewski & Johannes Horner, 2008. "How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect," 2008 Meeting Papers 895, Society for Economic Dynamics.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.