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Citations for "Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining"

by Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert

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  1. Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan, 2010. "Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1021, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
  2. Ashish Arora & Andrea Fosfuri & Thomas Roende, 2012. "Managing Licensing in a Market for Technology," NBER Working Papers 18203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Anton Suvorov & Natalia Tsybuleva, 2008. "Advice by an Informed Intermediary: Can You Trust Your Broker?," Working Papers w0121, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  4. Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1987. "Pre-Play Communication in Two-Person Sealed-Bid Double Auctions," Discussion Papers 744R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Alessandra Casella, 2008. "Storable Votes and Agenda Order Control. Theory and Experiments," Working Papers halshs-00349292, HAL.
  6. repec:hal:journl:hal-00641865 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Ma, Chenghu, 2000. "Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 451-482, March.
  8. Eichengreen, Barry & Ghironi, Fabio, 1997. "European Monetary Unification and International Monetary Cooperation," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt10d518tg, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  9. Fleckinger, Pierre, 2008. "Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-13, January.
  10. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2004. "The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 147-179, August.
  11. Joungseok Park, 2016. "The Strategic Manipulation of Asymmetric Climate Conflicts," Working Papers 16-21, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
  12. Alonso, Ricardo & Dessein, Wouter & Matouschek, Niko, 2006. "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5802, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. repec:got:cegedp:77 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Saran, Rene, 2011. "Bilateral trading with naive traders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 544-557, June.
  15. Ricardo Alonso & Wouter Dessein & Niko Matouschek, 2008. "When does coordination require centralization?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58664, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  16. Adrian Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2014. "For those about to talk we salute you: an experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(2), pages 173-199, June.
  17. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2012. "The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2897-2922, October.
  18. Di Maggio, Marco, 2009. "Accountability and Cheap Talk," MPRA Paper 18652, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Kim Jeong-Yoo & Jun Tackseung, 2008. "Connectivity and Allocation Rule in a Directed Network," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-21, September.
  20. Olivier Gossner & Nicolas Melissas, 2006. "Informational cascades elicit private information," Post-Print halshs-00754174, HAL.
  21. David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, 1998. "Cheap Talk and Burned Money," Discussion Papers 1245, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  22. Alexey Kushnir, 2010. "Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets," Working Papers 2010.121, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  23. Barry Sopher & Revan Sopher, 2013. "An Experiment on Partnership Protocols for Bilateral Trade with Incomplete Information," Departmental Working Papers 201304, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  24. Grant, Simon & Quiggin, John, 1998. "The meeting place problem: Salience and search," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 271-283, January.
  25. Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-055/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 31 Oct 2011.
  26. Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2012. "Communication in Cournot Oligopoly," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20121, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  27. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Lee, Ching Chyi, 1998. "Bargaining and Search with Incomplete Information about Outside Options," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 203-237, February.
  28. Sally, David, 2005. "Can I say "bobobo" and mean "There's no such thing as cheap talk"?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 245-266, July.
  29. A. Arrighetti & S. Curatolo, 2010. "Costi di coordinamento e vantaggi di aggregazione: esiti, morfologia e processi di interazione in un mondo artificiale multi-agente," Economics Department Working Papers 2010-EP01, Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy).
  30. Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2007. "Strategic Information Transmission through the Media," MPRA Paper 5556, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2007.
  31. Lechner, Susanne & Ohr, Renate, 2008. "The right of withdrawal in the treaty of Lison: A game theoretic reflection on different decision processes in the EU," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 77, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  32. Agastya, Murali & Menezes, Flavio & Sengupta, Kunal, 2007. "Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 1-19, July.
  33. Arvan, Lanny & Cabral, Luis & Santos, Vasco, 1999. "Meaningful cheap talk must improve equilibrium payoffs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 97-106, January.
  34. Nahum D. Melumad & Toshiyuki Shibano, 1991. "Communication in Settings with No. Transfers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 173-198, Summer.
  35. Siddiqi, Hammad, 2007. "Stock Price Manipulation: The Role of Intermediaries," MPRA Paper 6374, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  36. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2013. "Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Battle of the Sexes with Two-Sided Private Information," Discussion Papers 13-01r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  37. Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan, 2013. "Informational loss in bundled bargaining," Journal of Theoretical Politics, SAGE Publishing, vol. 25(3), pages 338-362, July.
  38. Wang, Ruqu, 2000. "Bidding and renegotiation in procurement auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(8), pages 1577-1597, August.
  39. Arifovic, Jasmina & Eaton, B. Curtis, 1998. "The evolution of type communication in a sender/receiver game of common interest with cheap talk," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1187-1207, August.
  40. repec:dpr:wpaper:0746 is not listed on IDEAS
  41. Spencer, Michael A. & Shogren, Jason F., 2000. "Protocol for inexperienced Coasean bargainers confronting delay costs," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 79-90, January.
  42. Casella, Alessandra, 2011. "Agenda control as a cheap talk game: Theory and experiments with Storable Votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 46-76, May.
  43. Campbell, Colin M., 1998. "Coordination in Auctions with Entry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 425-450, October.
  44. Saran, Rene, 2012. "How Naiveté improves efficiency in trading with preplay communication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 311-314.
  45. Gad Allon & Achal Bassamboo, 2011. "Buying from the Babbling Retailer? The Impact of Availability Information on Customer Behavior," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(4), pages 713-726, April.
  46. Laura O. Taylor & Ronald G. Cummings, 1999. "Unbiased Value Estimates for Environmental Goods: A Cheap Talk Design for the Contingent Valuation Method," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 649-665, June.
  47. Lim, Wooyoung, 2014. "Communication in bargaining over decision rights," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 159-179.
  48. Archishman Chakraborty & Nandini Gupta & Rick Harbaugh, 2002. "Seller Cheap Talk in Common Value Auctions," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2002-30, Claremont Colleges.
  49. Arleta Rasmußen, 2014. "The influence of face-to-face communication: a principal-agent experiment," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 22(1), pages 73-88, March.
  50. Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-037/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 31 Oct 2011.
  51. de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Offerman, Theo & Onderstal, Sander, 2015. "Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 14-25.
  52. Ying Chen, 2010. "Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information," 2010 Meeting Papers 1159, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  53. Croson, Rachel & Boles, Terry & Murnighan, J. Keith, 2003. "Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 143-159, June.
  54. Matthew Backus & Tom Blake & Steven Tadelis, 2015. "Cheap Talk, Round Numbers, and the Economics of Negotiation," NBER Working Papers 21285, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  55. Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-153/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  56. Bruno Biais & Pierre Hillion & Chester Spatt, 1999. "Price Discovery and Learning during the Preopening Period in the Paris Bourse," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(6), pages 1218-1248, December.
  57. Christian A. Vossler & Gregory L. Poe & William D. Schulze & Kathleen Segerson, 2006. "Communication and Incentive Mechanisms Based on Group Performance: An Experimental Study of Nonpoint Pollution Control," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 44(4), pages 599-613, October.
  58. Gayer Gabrielle & Segev Ella, 2012. "Revealing Private Information in Bargaining," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-34, December.
  59. Saran Rene, 2007. "In Bargaining We Trust," Research Memorandum 049, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  60. Ganguly, Chirantan & Ray, Indrajit, 2015. "Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Game with Two-Sided Private Information," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2015/7, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  61. Valley, Kathleen & Thompson, Leigh & Gibbons, Robert & Bazerman, Max H., 2002. "How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 127-155, January.
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