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Trust and Truth

Author

Listed:
  • Tore Ellingsen
  • Magnus Johannesson
  • Jannie Lilja
  • Henrik Zetterqvist

Abstract

In a laboratory experiment, we create relationships between pairs of anonymous subjects through a Prisoners' dilemma game. Thereafter the same subjects play a private values bargaining game with or without communication. Communication substantially increases bargaining efficiency among subjects who cooperated in the Prisoners' dilemma but has no significant effect on bargaining outcomes when one subject defected. Subjects who cooperated in the Prisoners' dilemma bid more aggressively if their opponent defected. Cooperators also lie more about their valuations when their opponent defected. The results constitute novel evidence that many people are strong reciprocators. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.

Suggested Citation

  • Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson & Jannie Lilja & Henrik Zetterqvist, 2009. "Trust and Truth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(534), pages 252-276, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:119:y:2009:i:534:p:252-276
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    • Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson & Jannie Lilja & Henrik Zetterqvist, 2009. "Trust and Truth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(534), pages 252-276, January.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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