Trust and Truth
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- Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Lilja, Jannie & Zetterqvist, Henrik, 2006. "Trust and truth," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 665, Stockholm School of Economics.
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- Jacob Goeree & Jingjing Zhang, 2014. "Communication & competition," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(3), pages 421-438, September.
- Pfaff, Alexander & Vélez, Maria Alejandra, 2012. "Efficiency and equity in negotiated resource transfers: Contributions and limitations of trust with limited contracts," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 55-63.
- López-Pérez, Raúl, 2012. "The power of words: A model of honesty and fairness," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 642-658.
- Rosaz, Julie & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2012.
"Lies and biased evaluation: A real-effort experiment,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 537-549.
- Julie Rosaz & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00947962, HAL.
- Julie Rosaz & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2011. "Lies and Biased Evaluation : A Real-Effort Experiment," Working Papers 1124, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Julie Rosaz & Marie Claire Villeval, 2012. "Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00617120, HAL.
- Rosaz, Julie & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2011. "Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 5884, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Julian Conrads & Mischa Ellenberger & Bernd Irlenbusch & Elia Nora Ohms & Rainer Michael Rilke & Gari Walkowitz, 2017. "Team Goal Incentives and Individual Lying Behavior," WHU Working Paper Series - Economics Group 17-02, WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management.
- Galanis, Spyros & Vlassopoulos, Michael, 2014. "Concern for relative standing and deception," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1403, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Conrads, Julian & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Rilke, Rainer Michael & Walkowitz, Gari, 2013. "Lying and team incentives," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 1-7.
- Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2012.
"Credible communication and cooperation: Experimental evidence from multi-stage Games,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 207-219.
- Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2011. "Credible Communication and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Multi-stage Games," Working Paper Series 883, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- López-Pérez, Raúl, 2009. "The Power of Words: Why Communication fosters Cooperation and Efficiency," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2009/01, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
- repec:kap:regeco:v:52:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11149-017-9329-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- Robbett, Andrea, 2016. "Sustaining cooperation in heterogeneous groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 132(PA), pages 121-138.
- Xiao, Erte, 2013. "Profit-seeking punishment corrupts norm obedience," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 321-344.
- Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2007. "More Communication, Less Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Multi-stage Games," Working Papers 2007:4, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 24 Nov 2010.
- Agnes Baeker & Mario Mechtel, 2015. "Peer Settings Induce Cheating on Task Performance," IAAEU Discussion Papers 201506, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
More about this item
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
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