The right of withdrawal in the treaty of Lison: A game theoretic reflection on different decision processes in the EU
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- Susanne Lechner & Renate Ohr, 2011. "The right of withdrawal in the treaty of Lisbon: a game theoretic reflection on different decision processes in the EU," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 357-375, December.
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- Ohr Renate, 2015. "Europäische Integration am Wendepunkt? Zum möglichen Austritt Großbritanniens aus der EU / European integration at a turning point? Consequences of a British exit for the EU," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 66(1), pages 99-114, January.
More about this item
KeywordsEuropean Integration; Game Theory; Secession;
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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