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A viable insolvency procedure for sovereigns (VIPS) in the euro area

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  • Fuest, Clemens
  • Heinemann, Friedrich
  • Schröder, Christoph

Abstract

A mechanism to restructure the debt of an insolvent euro country is a missing element in the emerging institutional architecture of the euro area. The introduction of an insolvency procedure for sovereigns faces a dilemma: In the foreseeable future, its introduction would risk pushing Europe back into acute crisis. But the indefinite postponement of reform would impair the credibility of a future regime change. Against this background, this paper reviews arguments and existing blueprints for sovereign insolvency procedures in the euro area and develops a 'Viable Insolvency Procedure for Sovereigns' (VIPS). VIPS avoids any sudden measures which could destabilize the present fragile situation but carefully designs an irreversible transition towards the new regime. The VIPS proposal comprises two pillars: An insolvency procedure for the long run and a credible bridge towards that system.

Suggested Citation

  • Fuest, Clemens & Heinemann, Friedrich & Schröder, Christoph, 2014. "A viable insolvency procedure for sovereigns (VIPS) in the euro area," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-053, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:14053
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    Cited by:

    1. Schröder, Christoph, 2014. "Haircut size, haircut type and the probability of serial sovereign debt restructurings," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-126, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    2. Ernesto Longobardi & Antonio Pedone, 2018. "On some recent proposals of public debt restructuring in the Eurozone," Chapters, in: Giuseppe Eusepi & Richard E. Wagner (ed.), Debt Default and Democracy, chapter 6, pages 84-123, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Jochen Andritzky & Désirée I. Christofzik & Lars P. Feld & Uwe Scheuering, 2019. "A mechanism to regulate sovereign debt restructuring in the euro area," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 20-34, May.
    4. Bofinger, Peter & Schnabel, Isabel & Feld, Lars P. & Schmidt, Christoph M. & Wieland, Volker, 2015. "Zukunftsfähigkeit in den Mittelpunkt. Jahresgutachten 2015/16 [Focus on Future Viability. Annual Report 2015/16]," Annual Economic Reports / Jahresgutachten, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, volume 127, number 201516.
    5. König, Jörg, 2016. "Von der Währungs- zur Transferunion," Argumente zur Marktwirtschaft und Politik 132, Stiftung Marktwirtschaft / The Market Economy Foundation, Berlin.
    6. van Riet, Ad, 2015. "Market-preserving fiscal federalism in the European Monetary Union," MPRA Paper 77772, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Schmidt, André, 2014. "Elemente einer Fiskalverfassung für die Eurozone," Beiträge zur Jahrestagung 2014 (Goettingen) 107394, Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Wirtschaftssysteme und Institutionenökonomik.
    8. Trebesch, Christoph, 2015. "Kurzgutachten zu Staatsschuldenkrisen," Working Papers 06/2015, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
    9. Bodo Herzog, 2016. "Modelling Monetary and Fiscal Governance in the Wake of the Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe," Economies, MDPI, vol. 4(2), pages 1-11, May.
    10. Busch, Berthold & Matthes, Jürgen, 2015. "Ein Staatsinsolvenzverfahren für den Euroraum," IW policy papers 23/2015, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW) / German Economic Institute.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    euro area debt crisis; sovereign insolvency procedure;

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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