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European Monetary Union reform preferences of French and German parliamentarians

Author

Listed:
  • Blesse, Sebastian
  • Boyer, Pierre C.
  • Heinemann, Friedrich
  • Janeba, Eckhard
  • Raj, Anasuya

Abstract

This study analyzes results from an original survey of members of the French and German parliaments (Assemblée Nationale, Sénat and Bundestag) on economic policies and institutions of the Eurozone. We find that French politicians are significantly more supportive of Eurobonds, a European unemployment insurance scheme, and an active monetary policy by the ECB than German politicians. At the same time, there are significant differences along party lines, which are often quantitatively more important than differences in nationality. Left-leaning members of parliaments are in favor of new policy instruments at the European or Eurozone level, but are skeptical about the fiscal constraints of the Fiscal Compact. There is widespread consensus across parties and countries that more investment at national levels is warranted.

Suggested Citation

  • Blesse, Sebastian & Boyer, Pierre C. & Heinemann, Friedrich & Janeba, Eckhard & Raj, Anasuya, 2017. "European Monetary Union reform preferences of French and German parliamentarians," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-059, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:17059
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    EMU reforms; policy preferences; elite survey; members of national parliament; comparative politics;

    JEL classification:

    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General

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