IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/diw/diwdeb/2013-4-4.html

Members of German Federal Parliament More Risk-Loving Than General Population

Author

Listed:
  • Moritz Heß
  • Christian von Scheve
  • Jürgen Schupp
  • Gert G. Wagner

Abstract

Politics and business often involve making risky or dangerous decisions whose outcomes can be predicted only with difficulty, if at all. As attitudes toward risks and dangers vary between individuals, it is reasonable that people with different attitudes are active in areas requiring decisions with differing degrees of risk. For example, it has frequently been observed that entrepreneurs are more risk-loving than employees. In late 2011, we surveyed members of the German Bundestag (federal parliament) as to their attitude toward risk (and danger or uncertainty), revealing that they are far more risk-loving than average people; they are even significantly more risk-loving than the self-employed.1 It is possible to take a critical view of the fact that politicians are prepared to assume higher risks than the general population normally would. In this respect, politicians do not represent the population. Yet, we interpret this finding in a positive manner, as a socially rational "division of labor" between citizens, voters, and politicians in the context of a representative democracy whose institutions limit risk-seeking and power.

Suggested Citation

  • Moritz Heß & Christian von Scheve & Jürgen Schupp & Gert G. Wagner, 2013. "Members of German Federal Parliament More Risk-Loving Than General Population," DIW Economic Bulletin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 3(4), pages 20-24.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwdeb:2013-4-4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.419116.de/diw_econ_bull_2013-04-4.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ambuehl, Sandro & Blesse, Sebastian & Doerrenberg, Philipp & Feldhaus, Christoph & Ockenfels, Axel, 2023. "Politicians' social welfare criteria - An experiment with German legislators," ZEW Discussion Papers 23-013, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    2. Hannes Kröger & Jürgen Schupp & Johann Behrens, 2014. "Unlocking further potential in the National Cohort study (NaKo) through comparability with the German Socio-Economic Panel," RatSWD Working Papers 237, German Data Forum (RatSWD).
    3. Sorokin, Constantine & Zakharov, Alexei, 2018. "Vote-motivated candidates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 232-254.
    4. Sebastian Blesse & Pierre C Boyer & Friedrich Heinemann & Eckhard Janeba & Anasuya Raj, 2019. "European Monetary Union reform preferences of French and German parliamentarians," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(3), pages 406-424, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:diw:diwdeb:2013-4-4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bibliothek (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/diwbede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.