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Financial Crises and the Multilateral Response: What the Historical Record Shows

In: Global Financial Crisis

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Bergljot Barkbu
  • Barry Eichengreen
  • Ashoka Mody

Abstract

We provide a synoptic description of financial crises and the multilateral response over the course of the last four decades. We present both indicators of economic performance around crisis dates and a comprehensive description of multilateral rescue efforts. While emergency lending has grown, reliance on debt restructuring, broadly speaking, has declined. This leads us to ask what can be done to rebalance the management of debt problems toward a better mix of emergency lending and private sector burden sharing. In particular, we explore the idea of sovereign cocos, contingent debt securities that automatically reduce payment obligations in the event of debt-sustainability problems.

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This chapter was published in:
  • Charles Engel & Kristin Forbes & Jeffrey Frankel, 2012. "Global Financial Crisis," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number enge11-2, October.
    • This item is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Chapters with number 13158.
    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:13158
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    Find related papers by JEL classification:
    • F0 - International Economics - - General
    • F4 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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    1. Michael Bordo & Barry Eichengreen & Daniela Klingebiel & Maria Soledad Martinez-Peria, 2001. "Is the crisis problem growing more severe?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 16(32), pages 51-82, 04.
    2. Oya Celasun & Xavier Debrun & Jonathan D. Ostry, 2006. "Primary Surplus Behavior and Risks to Fiscal Sustainability in Emerging Market Countries: A "Fan-Chart" Approach," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 53(3), pages 1-3.
    3. Boughton, James M, 2000. "From Suez to Tequila: The IMF as Crisis Manager," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(460), pages 273-291, January.
    4. Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, 2004. "Do Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(495), pages 247-264, 04.
    5. Suresh Sundaresan & Zhenyu Wang, 2010. "Design of contingent capital with a stock price trigger for mandatory conversion," Staff Reports 448, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    6. Pennacchi, George & Vermaelen, Theo & Wolff, Christian C. P., 2014. "Contingent Capital: The Case of COERCs," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(03), pages 541-574, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean Pisani-Ferry & André Sapir & Guntram B. Wolff, . "EU-IMF assistance to euro area countries: an early assessment," Blueprints, Bruegel, number 779, September.
    2. Consiglio, Andrea & Zenios, Stavros A., 2015. "The Case for Contingent Convertible Debt for Sovereignst," Working Papers 15-13, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
    3. O'Rourke, Kevin Hjortshøj, 2015. "Economic impossibilities for our grandchildren?," CEPR Discussion Papers 10974, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Consiglio, Andrea & Tumminello, Michele & Zenios, Stavros A., 2016. "Pricing Sovereign Contingent Convertible Debt," Working Papers 16-05, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
    5. Eichengreen, Barry & Jung, Naeun & Moch, Stephen & Mody, Ashoka, 2014. "The Eurozone Crisis: Phoenix Miracle or Lost Decade?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 39(PB), pages 288-308.
    6. Edwin M. Truman, 2013. "Asian and European Financial Crises Compared," Working Paper Series WP13-9, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    7. Fuest, Clemens & Heinemann, Friedrich & Schröder, Christoph, 2014. "A viable insolvency procedure for sovereigns (VIPS) in the euro area," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-053, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    8. ORASTEAN Ramona, 2014. "The Lending Arrangements Of The Imf In European Union In Times Of Crisis – Characteristics And Evolutions," Studies in Business and Economics, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 9(1), pages 134-141, April.
    9. Cassola, Nuno & Jorge, José, 2016. "The ECB's OMTs: A tale of governments, investors, and the central bank," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 94-116.
    10. Dungey, Mardi & Jacobs, Jan P.A.M. & Lestano,, 2015. "The internationalisation of financial crises: Banking and currency crises 1883–2008," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 29-47.
    11. Xavier De Scheemaekere & Kim Oosterlinck & Ariane Szafarz, 2014. "Issues in Identifying Economic Crises: Insights from History," Working Papers CEB 14-014, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    12. Belke, Ansgar & Gros, Daniel, 2016. "Negative Rates and Seigniorage: Turning the central bank business model upside down? The special case of the ECB," CEPS Papers 11753, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    13. Sven Steinkamp & Frank Westermann, 2016. "Multilateral Loans and Interest Rates: Further Evidence on the Seniority Conundrum," CESifo Working Paper Series 6225, CESifo Group Munich.
    14. Deborah Mabbett & Waltraud Schelkle, 2015. "What difference does Euro membership make to stabilization? The political economy of international monetary systems revisited," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(3), pages 508-534, June.
    15. Hartmann, Philipp & Hubrich, Kirstin & Kremer, Manfred & Tetlow, Robert J., 2013. "Melting down: Systemic financial instability and the macroeconomy," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80487, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    16. Sven Steinkamp & Frank Westermann, 2014. "The role of creditor seniority in Europe's sovereign debt crisis," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 29(79), pages 495-552, 07.
    17. Gharyeni, Abdellatif & Jouili, Mustapha, 2015. "Dette extérieure et croissance économique dans les pays à revenu intermédiaire : Essai empirique
      [External Debt and Economic Growth in the Middle-Income Countries :Empirical Test]      ," MPRA Paper 69122, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Jan 2016.

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