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Convertible Bonds and Bank Risk-Taking

Author

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  • Natalya Martynova

    (University of Amsterdam)

  • Enrico Perotti

    (University of Amsterdam)

Abstract

We study how contingent capital affects banks' risk choices. When triggered in highly levered states, going-concern conversion reduces risk-taking incentives, unlike conversion at default by traditional bail-inable debt. Interestingly, contingent capital (CoCo) may be less risky than bail-inable debt as its lower priority is compensated by a lower induced risk. The main benecial effect on risk incentives comes from reduced leverage upon conversion, while any equity dilution has the opposite effect. This is in contrast to traditional convertible debt, since CoCo bondholders have a short option position. As a result, principal writedown CoCo debt is most desirable for risk preventive purposes, although the effect may be tempered by a higher yield. The risk reduction effect of CoCo debt depends critically on the informativeness of the trigger. As it should ensure deleveraging in all states with high risk incentives, it is always inferior to pure equity.

Suggested Citation

  • Natalya Martynova & Enrico Perotti, 2012. "Convertible Bonds and Bank Risk-Taking," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-106/IV/DSF41, Tinbergen Institute, revised 10 Oct 2016.
  • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120106
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Avdjiev, Stefan & Bogdanova, Bilyana & Bolton, Patrick & Jiang, Wei & Kartasheva, Anastasia, 2017. "CoCo Issuance and Bank Fragility," CEPR Discussion Papers 12418, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pierluigi Bologna & Arianna Miglietta & Anatoli Segura, 2018. "Contagion in the CoCos market? A case study of two stress events," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1201, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    2. Daniël Vullings, 2016. "Contingent convertible bonds with floating coupon payments: fixing the equilibrium problem," DNB Working Papers 517, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    3. Heller, Yuval & Peleg Lazar, Sharon & Raviv, Alon, 2019. "Banks Risk Taking and Creditors Bargaining Power," MPRA Paper 91381, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Avdjiev, Stefan & Bogdanova, Bilyana & Bolton, Patrick & Jiang, Wei & Kartasheva, Anastasia, 2017. "CoCo Issuance and Bank Fragility," CEPR Discussion Papers 12418, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Mendicino, Caterina & Nikolov, Kalin & Suarez, Javier, 2017. "Equity versus bail-in debt in banking: an agency perspective," ESRB Working Paper Series 50, European Systemic Risk Board.
    6. Guglielmo Maria Caporale & Woo-Young Kang, 2019. "On the preferences of CoCo bond buyers and sellers: a logistic regression analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 7551, CESifo Group Munich.
    7. repec:eee:finana:v:59:y:2018:i:c:p:77-93 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:eee:jmacro:v:54:y:2017:i:pb:p:285-305 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Tanaka, Misa & Vourdas, John, 2018. "Equity, debt and moral hazard: the optimal structure of banks’ loss absorbing capacity," Bank of England working papers 745, Bank of England.
    10. Martijn A. Boermans & Sweder van Wijnbergen, 2018. "Contingent convertible bonds: Who invests in European CoCos?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(4), pages 234-238, February.
    11. Heller, Yuval & Peleg-Lazar, Sharon & Raviv, Alon, 2019. "A closed-form solution to the risk-taking motivation of subordinated debtholders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 169-173.
    12. Stephanie Chan & Sweder van Wijnbergen, 2014. "Cocos, Contagion and Systemic Risk," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-110/VI/DSF79, Tinbergen Institute, revised 29 Oct 2014.
    13. Hesse, Henning, 2018. "Incentive effects from write-down CoCo bonds: An empirical analysis," SAFE Working Paper Series 212, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.
    14. Fatouh, Mahmoud & McMunn, Ayowande, 2019. "Shareholder risk-taking incentives in the presence of contingent capital," Bank of England working papers 775, Bank of England.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Risk shifting; Financial Leverage; Contingent Capital;

    JEL classification:

    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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