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CoCo Issuance and Bank Fragility

Author

Listed:
  • Stefan Avdjiev
  • Bilyana Bogdanova
  • Patrick Bolton
  • Wei Jiang
  • Anastasia Kartasheva

Abstract

The promise of contingent convertible capital securities (CoCos) as a “bail-in” solution has been the subject of considerable theoretical analysis and debate, but little is known about their effects in practice. In this paper, we undertake the first comprehensive empirical analysis of bank CoCo issues, a market segment that comprises over 730 instruments totaling $521 billion. Four main findings emerge: 1) The propensity to issue a CoCo is higher for larger and better-capitalized banks; 2) CoCo issues result in statistically significant declines in issuers’ CDS spreads, indicating that they generate risk-reduction benefits and lower costs of debt. This is especially true for CoCos that: i) convert into equity, ii) have mechanical triggers, iii) are classified as Additional Tier 1 instruments; 3) CoCos with only discretionary triggers do not have a significant impact on CDS spreads; 4) CoCo issues have no statistically significant impact on stock prices, except for principal write-down CoCos with a high trigger level, which have a positive effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Avdjiev & Bilyana Bogdanova & Patrick Bolton & Wei Jiang & Anastasia Kartasheva, 2017. "CoCo Issuance and Bank Fragility," NBER Working Papers 23999, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23999
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pierluigi Bologna & Arianna Miglietta & Anatoli Segura, 2018. "Contagion in the CoCos market? A case study of two stress events," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1201, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    2. Mike Derksen & Peter Spreij & Sweder van Wijnbergen, 2018. "Accounting Noise and the Pricing of CoCos," Papers 1804.06890, arXiv.org.
    3. Goncharenko, Roman & Ongena, Steven & Rauf, Asad, 2018. "The Agency of CoCos: Why Contingent Convertible Bonds Aren't for Everyone," CEPR Discussion Papers 13344, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Martynova, Natalya & Perotti, Enrico, 2018. "Convertible bonds and bank risk-taking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 35(PB), pages 61-80.
    5. Gaëtan Le Quang, 2019. "Mind the Conversion Risk: a Theoretical Assessment of Contingent Convertible Bonds," EconomiX Working Papers 2019-5, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    6. Masayuki Kazato & Tetsuya Yamada, 2018. "The Implied Bail-in Probability in the Contingent Convertible Securities Market," IMES Discussion Paper Series 18-E-03, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
    7. Goncharenko, Roman & Ongena, Steven & Rauf, Asad, 2017. "The agency of CoCo: Why do banks issue contingent convertible bonds?," CFS Working Paper Series 586, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    8. Hesse, Henning, 2018. "Incentive effects from write-down CoCo bonds: An empirical analysis," SAFE Working Paper Series 212, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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