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Learning to Play Nash from the Best

I experimentally investigate the effects of the ability to imitate successful others on convergence to the one-shot Nash equilibrium. I study a two-player game (Potters and Suetens Forthcoming) in which a single parameter determines the existence of strategic complementarities. I generally confirm previous findings when learning from others is not possible: games with strategic complementarities converge more robustly to the Nash equilibrium than those without. However, I find the reverse with the ability to learn from successful others as this information significantly improves convergence in games without strategic complementarities but has no effect and possibly a negative effect on games with complementarities.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Williams College in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 2009-03.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wil:wileco:2009-03
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