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Behavioral explanations of efficient public good allocations


  • Harstad, Ronald M.
  • Marrese, Michael


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  • Harstad, Ronald M. & Marrese, Michael, 1982. "Behavioral explanations of efficient public good allocations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 367-383, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:19:y:1982:i:3:p:367-383

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. McLure, Charles Jr., 1975. "General equilibrium incidence analysis : The Harberger model after ten years," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 125-161, February.
    2. Jones, Ronald W, 1971. "Distortions in Factor Markets and the General Equilibrium Model of Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(3), pages 437-459, May-June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Josef Falkinger, 2000. "A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 247-264, March.
    2. Yan Chen & Robert Gazzale, 2004. "When Does Learning in Games Generate Convergence to Nash Equilibria? The Role of Supermodularity in an Experimental Setting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1505-1535, December.
    3. Yan Chen & Fang-Fang Tang, 1998. "Learning and Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for Public Goods Provision: An Experimental Study," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(3), pages 633-662, June.
    4. Ledyard, John O., "undated". "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Working Papers 861, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    5. Julian Rauchdobler & Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2010. "Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 66(1), pages 34-64, March.
    6. Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2015. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation," CESifo Working Paper Series 5300, CESifo Group Munich.
    7. Rondeau, Daniel & D. Schulze, William & Poe, Gregory L., 1999. "Voluntary revelation of the demand for public goods using a provision point mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 455-470, June.
    8. Luigi Mittone & Francesca Bortolami, 2007. "Free riding and norms of control: self determination and imposition. An experimental comparison," CEEL Working Papers 0704, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    9. Robert S. Gazzale, 2009. "Learning to Play Nash from the Best," Department of Economics Working Papers 2009-03, Department of Economics, Williams College.
    10. Nick Feltovich & John Duffy, 1999. "Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An experimental study," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(1), pages 131-152.
    11. Gregory Poe & Jeremy Clark & Daniel Rondeau & William Schulze, 2002. "Provision Point Mechanisms and Field Validity Tests of Contingent Valuation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 23(1), pages 105-131, September.
    12. Bracht, Juergen & Figuieres, Charles & Ratto, Marisa, 2008. "Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1-2), pages 54-90, February.
    13. Ronald Harstad, 2000. "Dominant Strategy Adoption and Bidders' Experience with Pricing Rules," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 3(3), pages 261-280, December.
    14. Healy, Paul J. & Mathevet, Laurent, 2012. "Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.

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