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Search Diversion and Platform Competition

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  • Hagiu, Andrei
  • Jullien, Bruno

Abstract

Platforms use search diversion in order to trade off total consumer traffic for higher revenues derived by exposing consumers to unsolicited products (e.g. advertising). We show that the entry of a platform competitor leads to higher (lower) equilibrium levels of search diversion relative to a monopoly platform when the degree of horizontal differentiation between platforms is intermediate (low). On the other hand, more intense competition between active platforms (i.e. less differentiation) leads to less search diversion. When platforms charge consumers fixed access fees, all equilibrium levels of search diversion under platform competition are equal to the monopoly level, irrespective of the nature of competition. Furthermore, platforms that charge positive (negative) access fees to consumers have weaker (stronger) incentives to divert search relative to platforms that cannot charge such fees. Finally, endogenous affiliation on both sides (consumers and advertising) leads to stronger incentives to divert search relative to the one-sided exogenous affiliation (vertical integration) benchmark, whenever the marginal advertiser derives higher profits per consumer exposure relative to the average advertiser.

Suggested Citation

  • Hagiu, Andrei & Jullien, Bruno, 2013. "Search Diversion and Platform Competition," TSE Working Papers 13-431, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:27585
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gokhan Guven & Eren Inci & Antonio Russo, 2017. "Apparent Competition in Two-Sided Platforms," CESifo Working Paper Series 6660, CESifo.
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    3. Matthias Hunold & Reinhold Kesler & Ulrich Laitenberger, 2020. "Rankings of Online Travel Agents, Channel Pricing, and Consumer Protection," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(1), pages 92-116, January.
    4. Fan, Ying & Fu, Yuqi & Yang, Zan, 2024. "Door-in-the-face heuristics: Intermediaries’ diversion in rental markets," Working Paper Series 24/2, Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Real Estate and Construction Management & Banking and Finance.
    5. Alaoui, Larbi & Germano, Fabrizio, 2020. "Time scarcity and the market for news," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 173-195.
    6. Martin Peitz, 2023. "Governance and Regulation of Platforms," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_480, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    7. Bo Zhou & Tianxin Zou, 2023. "Competing for Recommendations: The Strategic Impact of Personalized Product Recommendations in Online Marketplaces," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(2), pages 360-376, March.
    8. Hui Song, 2021. "Prominence of store-brand products in an electronic platform," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 47-83, June.
    9. Marc Bourreau & Germain Gaudin, 2022. "Streaming platform and strategic recommendation bias," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 25-47, February.
    10. Germano, Fabrizio & Sobbrio, Francesco, 2020. "Opinion dynamics via search engines (and other algorithmic gatekeepers)," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    11. Carrillo, Juan D. & Tan, Guofu, 2021. "Platform competition with complementary products," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    12. Huayong Du & Ying Teng & Zhenzhong Ma & Xuguang Guo, 2022. "Value Creation in Platform Enterprises: A Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(9), pages 1-21, April.
    13. Aridor, Guy & Gonçalves, Duarte, 2022. "Recommenders’ originals: The welfare effects of the dual role of platforms as producers and recommender systems," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    14. Tin Cheuk Leung & Koleman Strumpf, 2024. "Disentangling Demand and Supply of Media Bias: The Case of Newspaper Homepages," CESifo Working Paper Series 10890, CESifo.
    15. Morgane Cure & Matthias Hunold & Reinhold Kesler & Ulrich Laitenberger & Thomas Larrieu, 2022. "Vertical integration of platforms and product prominence," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 353-395, December.
    16. Zemin (Zachary) Zhong, 2023. "Platform Search Design: The Roles of Precision and Price," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(2), pages 293-313, March.
    17. Tavalaei, M. Mahdi, 2020. "Waiting time in two-sided platforms: The case of the airport industry," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    18. Fan, Ying & Fu, Yuqi & Yang, Zan & Chen, Ming, 2023. "Search Frictions in Rental Markets: Evidence from Urban China," Working Paper Series 23/11, Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Real Estate and Construction Management & Banking and Finance.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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