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A Theory of Financing Constraints and Firm Dynamics

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  • Gian Luca Clementi
  • Hugo Hopenhagn

Abstract

There is widespread evidence supporting the conjecture that borrowing constraints have important implications for firm growth and survival. In this paper we model a multi-period borrowing/lending relationship with asymmetric information. We show that borrowing constraints emerge as a feature of the optimal long-term lending contract, and that such constraints relax as the value of the borrower's claim to future cash-flows increases. We also show that the optimal contract has interesting implications for firm dynamics. In agreement with the empirical evidence, as age and size increase, mean and variance of growth decrease, firm survival increases, and the sensitivity of investment to cash-flows declines.
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Suggested Citation

  • Gian Luca Clementi & Hugo Hopenhagn, 2004. "A Theory of Financing Constraints and Firm Dynamics," Working Papers 04-25, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ste:nystbu:04-25
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    File URL: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/eco/wkpapers/04-25Clementi.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Esteban Rossi-Hansberg & Mark L. J. Wright, 2007. "Establishment Size Dynamics in the Aggregate Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1639-1666, December.
    2. Professor Yong Kim & Univ. Southern California, 2004. "Asset ownership and Asset Values Over Project Lifecycles," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 604, Econometric Society.
    3. HOSONO Kaoru, 2009. "Financial Crisis, Firm Dynamics and Aggregate Productivity in Japan," Discussion papers 09012, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    4. Pitchik, Carolyn, 2009. "Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 928-949, July.
    5. D'Erasmo, Pablo, 2006. "Investment and firm dynamics," MPRA Paper 3598, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Apr 2007.
    6. Matthias Messner & Nicola Pavoni, 2016. "On the Recursive Saddle Point Method," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 161-173, June.
    7. Arellano, Cristina & Bai, Yan & Zhang, Jing, 2012. "Firm dynamics and financial development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(6), pages 533-549.
    8. Galina Vereshchagina & Hugo A. Hopenhayn, 2009. "Risk Taking by Entrepreneurs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1808-1830, December.
    9. Harold L. Cole, 2008. "Self-Enforcing Stochastic Monitoring and the Separation of Debt and Equity Claims," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-025, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    10. George M. von Furstenberg & Ulf von Kalckreuth, 2007. "Dependence on External Finance by Manufacturing Sector: Examining the Measure and its Properties," Economie Internationale, CEPII research center, issue 111, pages 55-80.
    11. Nicola Cetorelli, 2009. "Credit market competition and the nature of firms," Staff Reports 366, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    12. Wright, Mark, 2004. "Firm Size Dynamics in the Aggregate Economy," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4rs4202s, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    13. Lustig, Hanno & Syverson, Chad & Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn, 2011. "Technological change and the growing inequality in managerial compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 601-627, March.
    14. Sakai, Koji & Uesugi, Iichiro & Watanabe, Tsutomu, 2010. "Firm age and the evolution of borrowing costs: Evidence from Japanese small firms," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(8), pages 1970-1981, August.
    15. Carlos González‐Aguado & Javier Suarez, 2015. "Interest Rates and Credit Risk," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(2-3), pages 445-480, March.
    16. Dmitry Orlov, 2014. "Optimal Design of Internal Disclosure," 2014 Meeting Papers 314, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    17. repec:eee:finlet:v:21:y:2017:i:c:p:57-65 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Harold Cole & Andrew Atkeson, 2004. "A Dynamic Theory of Optimal Capital Structure and Executive Compensation," 2004 Meeting Papers 267, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    19. Audretsch, David B. & Weigand, Jurgen, 2005. "Do knowledge conditions make a difference?: Investment, finance and ownership in German industries," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 595-613, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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