IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pur/prukra/1253.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Comment

Author

Listed:
  • Dan Kovenock
  • Brian Roberson

Abstract

Hausken (2008a) formulates a contest-theoretic model of the attack and defense of a network of targets. This note identi es a technical error that invalidates Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium for a substantial portion of the parameter space that he examines and provides necessary conditions for his solution to form a pure- strategy Nash equilibrium. Many of the existing results in the contest-theoretic liter- ature on the attack and defense of networks of targets rely upon Hausken's (2008a) characterization and require corresponding parameter restrictions. When these restric- tions are not met, the analysis of Clark and Konrad (2007) and Kovenock and Roberson (2010a) provides a foundation for constructing mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2010. "Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Comment," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1253, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1253
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/programs/phd/Working-papers-series/2010/1253.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Christiaan Hogendorn & Ka Yat Yuen, 2004. "Platform Competition with “Must-Have” Components," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2004-003, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
    2. Rosse, James N, 1970. "Estimating Cost Function Parameters without Using Cost Data: Illustrated Methodology," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(2), pages 256-275, March.
    3. Kaiser, Ulrich & Wright, Julian, 2006. "Price structure in two-sided markets: Evidence from the magazine industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 1-28, January.
    4. Rodrigues, Paulo M.M. & Taylor, A.M. Robert, 2007. "Efficient tests of the seasonal unit root hypothesis," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, pages 548-573.
    5. Robin S. Lee, 2013. "Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 2960-3000.
    6. Jean‐Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2006. "Two‐sided markets: a progress report," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, pages 645-667.
    7. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2014. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International.
    8. Dewenter, Ralf, 2003. "Media Markets with Habit Formation," Working Paper 5/2003, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
    9. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2014. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International.
    10. Christiaan Hogendorn & Stephen Ka Yat Yuen, 2009. "PLATFORM COMPETITION WITH 'MUST-HAVE' COMPONENTS -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 294-318, June.
    11. Church, Jeffrey & Gandal, Neil, 2004. "Platform Competition in Telecommunications," CEPR Discussion Papers 4659, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Marc Rysman, 2009. "The Economics of Two-Sided Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, pages 125-143.
    13. María Fernanda Viecens, 2009. "Pricing strategies in two-sided platforms: The role of sellers’ competition," Working Papers 2009-11, FEDEA.
    14. Helen Weeds, 2016. "TV Wars: Exclusive Content and Platform Competition in Pay TV," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(594), pages 1600-1633, August.
    15. Hans Jarle Kind & Tore Nilssen & Lars Sørgard, 2007. "Competition for Viewers and Advertisers in a TV Oligopoly," Journal of Media Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, pages 211-233.
    16. Whinston, Michael D, 1990. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 837-859.
    17. Marc Rysman, 2004. "Competition Between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 483-512.
    18. Robin S. Lee, 2013. "Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 2960-3000.
    19. Andrei Hagiu & Robin S. Lee, 2011. "Exclusivity and Control," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 679-708, September.
    20. repec:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:3:p:645-667 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Mark Armstrong & Julian Wright, 2007. "Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 353-380.
    22. Matthew Ellman & Fabrizio Germano, 2009. "What do the Papers Sell? A Model of Advertising and Media Bias," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(537), pages 680-704, April.
    23. David Strömberg, 2004. "Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 265-284.
    24. Marc Rysman, 2007. "AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PAYMENT CARD USAGE -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 1-36, March.
    25. Doganoglu, Toker & Wright, Julian, 2010. "Exclusive dealing with network effects," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 145-154, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2013. "The Attack-and-Defence Group Contests," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 049, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    2. Hausken, Kjell, 2010. "Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply on Comment," MPRA Paper 25497, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Oct 2010.
    3. Deck, Cary & Foster, Joshua & Song, Hongwei, 2015. "Defense against an opportunistic challenger: Theory and experiments," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 242(2), pages 501-513.
    4. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2012. "Strategic Defense And Attack For Series And Parallel Reliability Systems: Rejoinder," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, pages 521-524.
    5. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks," Working Papers 10-14, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    6. Kjell Hausken, 2012. "Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply to Rejoinder," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, pages 517-519.
    7. Kjell Hausken, 2012. "Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply to Rejoinder," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, pages 517-519.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game theory; Reliability theory; OR in military; Con ict; Contest; Network; Colonel Blotto game;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1253. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Krannert PHD). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/kspurus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.