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False targets efficiency in defense strategy

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  • Levitin, Gregory
  • Hausken, Kjell

Abstract

The paper analyzes the efficiency of deploying false targets as part of a defense strategy. It is assumed that the defender has a single object that can be destroyed by the attacker. The defender distributes its resource between deploying false targets and protecting the object from outside attacks. The attacker cannot distinguish the false targets from the defended object (genuine target). Therefore the attacker has no preferences for attacking one target rather than another target. The defender decides how many false targets to deploy whereas the attacker decides how many targets to attack. The article assumes that both the defender and attacker have complete information and full rationality. The optimal number of false targets and the attacked targets are obtained for the case of fixed and variable resources of the defender and the attacker as solutions of a non-cooperative game between the two agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2009. "False targets efficiency in defense strategy," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 194(1), pages 155-162, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:194:y:2009:i:1:p:155-162
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, January.
    2. Hausken, Kjell, 2008. "Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 186(2), pages 856-881, April.
    3. Vicki Bier & Santiago Oliveros & Larry Samuelson, 2007. "Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation against an Unknown Attacker," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(4), pages 563-587, August.
    4. Kunreuther, Howard & Heal, Geoffrey, 2003. "Interdependent Security," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 26(2-3), pages 231-249, March-May.
    5. Azaiez, M.N. & Bier, Vicki M., 2007. "Optimal resource allocation for security in reliability systems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 181(2), pages 773-786, September.
    6. Levitin, Gregory, 2003. "Optimal allocation of multi-state elements in linear consecutively connected systems with vulnerable nodes," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 150(2), pages 406-419, October.
    7. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April.
    8. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
    9. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    10. repec:eee:reensy:v:93:y:2008:i:11:p:1740-1750 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Hausken, Kjell, 2006. "Income, interdependence, and substitution effects affecting incentives for security investment," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 629-665.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:pal:jorsoc:v:61:y:2010:i:1:d:10.1057_jors.2008.158 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:eee:reensy:v:94:y:2009:i:5:p:973-981 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:eee:reensy:v:136:y:2015:i:c:p:35-46 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:eee:reensy:v:169:y:2018:i:c:p:224-234 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. repec:eee:reensy:v:112:y:2013:i:c:p:59-66 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2010. "Separation in homogeneous systems with independent identical elements," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 203(3), pages 625-634, June.
    7. Kjell Hausken, 2014. "Choosing what to protect when attacker resources and asset valuations are uncertain," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Organization and Management, vol. 3, pages 23-44.
    8. repec:eee:reensy:v:96:y:2011:i:12:p:1647-1656 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. repec:eee:reensy:v:112:y:2013:i:c:p:176-186 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. repec:eee:reensy:v:149:y:2016:i:c:p:137-147 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. repec:eee:reensy:v:169:y:2018:i:c:p:76-80 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. repec:eee:reensy:v:94:y:2009:i:12:p:1927-1941 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Zhuang, Jun & Bier, Vicki M. & Alagoz, Oguzhan, 2010. "Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 203(2), pages 409-418, June.
    14. Ye, Zhi-Sheng & Peng, Rui & Wang, Wenbin, 2017. "Defense and attack of performance-sharing common bus systemsAuthor-Name: Zhai, Qingqing," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 256(3), pages 962-975.

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