IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/reensy/v94y2009i11p1711-1717.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Meeting a demand vs. enhancing protections in homogeneous parallel systems

Author

Listed:
  • Levitin, Gregory
  • Hausken, Kjell

Abstract

The article considers defense resource allocation in a system exposed to planned and forced losses. The defender distributes its limited resource between deploying identical system elements and their protection from attacks. Planned losses arise if there are not enough elements to meet the demand. Forced losses arise if an external attack reduces the performance below the demand. The attacker distributes its effort evenly among all the elements or among elements from a chosen subset. The vulnerability of each element is determined by an attacker–defender contest success function. The expected damage caused by the attack is proportional to the system performance reduction below a planned level of demand satisfaction.

Suggested Citation

  • Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2009. "Meeting a demand vs. enhancing protections in homogeneous parallel systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 94(11), pages 1711-1717.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reensy:v:94:y:2009:i:11:p:1711-1717
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2009.05.011
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0951832009001082
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ress.2009.05.011?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1983. "Raising Rivals' Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 267-271, May.
    2. Hausken, Kjell, 2008. "Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 186(2), pages 856-881, April.
    3. Vicki Bier & Santiago Oliveros & Larry Samuelson, 2007. "Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation against an Unknown Attacker," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(4), pages 563-587, August.
    4. Kunreuther, Howard & Heal, Geoffrey, 2003. "Interdependent Security," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 26(2-3), pages 231-249, March-May.
    5. Azaiez, M.N. & Bier, Vicki M., 2007. "Optimal resource allocation for security in reliability systems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 181(2), pages 773-786, September.
    6. Levitin, Gregory, 2003. "Optimal allocation of multi-state elements in linear consecutively connected systems with vulnerable nodes," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 150(2), pages 406-419, October.
    7. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April.
    8. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
    9. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    10. Kjell Hausken, 2002. "Probabilistic Risk Analysis and Game Theory," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 22(1), pages 17-27, February.
    11. Hausken, Kjell, 2008. "Strategic defense and attack for reliability systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 93(11), pages 1740-1750.
    12. Hausken, Kjell, 2006. "Income, interdependence, and substitution effects affecting incentives for security investment," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 629-665.
    13. Hausken, Kjell & Levitin, Gregory, 2009. "Minmax defense strategy for complex multi-state systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 577-587.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Shun & Zhao, Xudong & Chen, Zhilong & Hou, Benwei & Wu, Yipeng, 2022. "A game-theoretic method to optimize allocation of defensive resource to protect urban water treatment plants against physical attacks," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 36(C).
    2. Levitin, G. & Gertsbakh, I. & Shpungin, Y., 2013. "Evaluating the damage associated with intentional supply deprivation in multi-commodity network," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 11-17.
    3. Ramirez-Marquez, José Emmanuel & Li, Qing, 2018. "Locating and protecting facilities from intentional attacks using secrecyAuthor-Name: Zhang, Chi," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 51-62.
    4. Su, Huai & Zio, Enrico & Zhang, Jinjun & Li, Xueyi, 2018. "A systematic framework of vulnerability analysis of a natural gas pipeline network," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 79-91.
    5. McCarter, Matthew & Barker, Kash & Johansson, Jonas & Ramirez-Marquez, Jose E., 2018. "A bi-objective formulation for robust defense strategies in multi-commodity networks," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 154-161.
    6. Musegaas, Marieke & Schlicher, Loe & Blok, Herman, 2022. "Stackelberg production-protection games: Defending crop production against intentional attacks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 297(1), pages 102-119.
    7. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2012. "Strategic Defense And Attack For Series And Parallel Reliability Systems: Comment," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(5), pages 507-515, October.
    8. Levitin, G. & Gertsbakh, I. & Shpungin, Y., 2011. "Evaluating the damage associated with intentional network disintegration," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 96(4), pages 433-439.
    9. Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2023. "How to preempt attacks in multi-front conflict with limited resources," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 305(1), pages 493-500.
    10. Ouyang, Min & Xu, Min & Zhang, Chi & Huang, Shitong, 2017. "Mitigating electric power system vulnerability to worst-case spatially localized attacks," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 144-154.
    11. Bricha, Naji & Nourelfath, Mustapha, 2013. "Critical supply network protection against intentional attacks: A game-theoretical model," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-10.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2010. "Separation in homogeneous systems with independent identical elements," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 203(3), pages 625-634, June.
    2. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2008. "Protection vs. redundancy in homogeneous parallel systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 93(10), pages 1444-1451.
    3. Kjell Hausken & Gregory Levitin, 2008. "Efficiency of Even Separation of Parallel Elements with Variable Contest Intensity," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 28(5), pages 1477-1486, October.
    4. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2009. "False targets efficiency in defense strategy," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 194(1), pages 155-162, April.
    5. Kjell Hausken, 2012. "Game Theoretic Analysis of Standby Systems," Chapters, in: Yair Holtzman (ed.), Advanced Topics in Applied Operations Management, IntechOpen.
    6. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2009. "Intelligence and impact contests in systems with redundancy, false targets, and partial protection," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 94(12), pages 1927-1941.
    7. Hausken, Kjell, 2008. "Strategic defense and attack for reliability systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 93(11), pages 1740-1750.
    8. Kjell Hausken & Vicki M. Bier & Jun Zhuang, 2009. "Defending Against Terrorism, Natural Disaster, and All Hazards," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Vicki M. M. Bier & M. Naceur Azaiez (ed.), Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats, chapter 4, pages 65-97, Springer.
    9. Hausken, Kjell, 2017. "Defense and attack for interdependent systems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 256(2), pages 582-591.
    10. Hausken, Kjell, 2008. "Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 186(2), pages 856-881, April.
    11. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2010. "Influence of attacker's target recognition ability on defense strategy in homogeneous parallel systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 95(5), pages 565-572.
    12. Hausken, Kjell & Zhuang, Jun, 2013. "The impact of disaster on the strategic interaction between company and government," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 225(2), pages 363-376.
    13. Ye, Zhi-Sheng & Peng, Rui & Wang, Wenbin, 2017. "Defense and attack of performance-sharing common bus systemsAuthor-Name: Zhai, Qingqing," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 256(3), pages 962-975.
    14. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2009. "Parallel systems under two sequential attacks," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 94(3), pages 763-772.
    15. Kjell Hausken & Jun Zhuang, 2011. "Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T -Period Game," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 8(1), pages 46-70, March.
    16. Hausken, Kjell, 2010. "Defense and attack of complex and dependent systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 29-42.
    17. R Peng & G Levitin & M Xie & S H Ng, 2011. "Optimal defence of single object with imperfect false targets," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 62(1), pages 134-141, January.
    18. Bricha, Naji & Nourelfath, Mustapha, 2013. "Critical supply network protection against intentional attacks: A game-theoretical model," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-10.
    19. Deck, Cary & Foster, Joshua & Song, Hongwei, 2015. "Defense against an opportunistic challenger: Theory and experiments," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 242(2), pages 501-513.
    20. Bier, Vicki M. & Hausken, Kjell, 2013. "Defending and attacking a network of two arcs subject to traffic congestion," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 214-224.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:reensy:v:94:y:2009:i:11:p:1711-1717. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/reliability-engineering-and-system-safety .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.