Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Rejoinder
In our original comment, we showed that Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium is invalid for much of the parameter space examined and provided necessary conditions for his solution to hold. Most of the comments in his reply are either tangential or irrelevant. However, several of the claims made in the reply reveal continuing misunderstandings and gaps in his understanding. In this rejoinder, we brie y clarify the fundamental issues.
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- Kjell Hausken, 2012. "Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems: reply 1 to comment 1," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(5), pages 525-531, October.
- Hausken, Kjell, 2010. "Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply on Comment," MPRA Paper 25497, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Oct 2010.
- Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2010. "The Optimal Defense of Networks of Targets," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1251, Purdue University, Department of Economics. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)