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Suicide Terrorism and the Weakest Link

Author

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  • Daniel G. Arce
  • Dan Kovenock J.
  • Brian Roberson

Abstract

In this paper we examine a model of terrorism which focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has the ability to utilize either or both suicide and conventional terrorism tactics. The terrorist organization’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize suicide attacks when other modes of attack are available, and the optimal anti-terrorism measures.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel G. Arce & Dan Kovenock J. & Brian Roberson, 2009. "Suicide Terrorism and the Weakest Link," CESifo Working Paper Series 2753, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2753
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    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp2753.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Yu‐Fu Chen & Michael Funke, 2010. "Booms, Recessions And Financial Turmoil: A Fresh Look At Investment Decisions Under Cyclical Uncertainty," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 57(3), pages 290-317, July.
    2. Raphael Bossong, 2011. "Public Good Theory and the 'Added Value' of the EU's Counterterrorism Policy," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 42, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    conflict; suicide terrorism; weakest link; Colonel Blotto;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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