IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/reensy/v193y2020ics0951832018314686.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Defending a parallel system against a strategic attacker with redundancy, protection and disinformation

Author

Listed:
  • Peng, Rui
  • Xiao, Hui
  • Guo, Jianjun
  • Lin, Chen

Abstract

Motivated by the defense of a power grid control center against cyber-attacks, this research considers the optimal allocation of defense resources for defending a parallel system consisting of identical elements. To enhance the system survivability, the defender distributes its limited resources to provide redundancy, disinform the attacker, and protect system elements. Correspondingly, the attacker allocates its limited resources to intelligence actions and impact contests. The defender determines the optimal number of genuine elements and false elements to deploy and the optimal amount of resources used for disinformation actions. The attacker seeks to maximize the system damage by taking the defender's strategy as given and allocating its resources optimally into intelligence actions and impact contests. Two types of parallel systems are considered: (1) where the system damage is defined as the probability of system failure, and (2) where the system damage is defined as the unsupplied demand of the system. Due to the complexity of the optimization model, we analyze the optimal defense strategy under various parameter settings via numerical methods. The results provide useful insights on how to defend such a system under different situations.

Suggested Citation

  • Peng, Rui & Xiao, Hui & Guo, Jianjun & Lin, Chen, 2020. "Defending a parallel system against a strategic attacker with redundancy, protection and disinformation," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reensy:v:193:y:2020:i:c:s0951832018314686
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2019.106651
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0951832018314686
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ress.2019.106651?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gregory Levitin & Kjell Hausken, 2009. "Intelligence and Impact Contests in Systems with Fake Targets," Defense & Security Analysis, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(2), pages 157-173, June.
    2. Vineet M. Payyappalli & Jun Zhuang & Victor Richmond R. Jose, 2017. "Deterrence and Risk Preferences in Sequential Attacker–Defender Games with Continuous Efforts," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(11), pages 2229-2245, November.
    3. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2009. "False targets efficiency in defense strategy," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 194(1), pages 155-162, April.
    4. Mo, Huadong & Xie, Min & Levitin, Gregory, 2015. "Optimal resource distribution between protection and redundancy considering the time and uncertainties of attacks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 243(1), pages 200-210.
    5. Peiqiu Guan & Meilin He & Jun Zhuang & Stephen C. Hora, 2017. "Modeling a Multitarget Attacker–Defender Game with Budget Constraints," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 14(2), pages 87-107, June.
    6. Bier, Vicki M. & Hausken, Kjell, 2013. "Defending and attacking a network of two arcs subject to traffic congestion," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 214-224.
    7. Zhang, Jing & Zhuang, Jun & Jose, Victor Richmond R., 2018. "The role of risk preferences in a multi-target defender-attacker resource allocation game," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 95-104.
    8. Hausken, Kjell & Levitin, Gregory, 2009. "Protection vs. false targets in series systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 94(5), pages 973-981.
    9. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April.
    10. Chi Zhang & Jose Ramirez-Marquez, 2013. "Protecting critical infrastructures against intentional attacks: a two-stage game with incomplete information," IISE Transactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(3), pages 244-258.
    11. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2009. "Intelligence and impact contests in systems with redundancy, false targets, and partial protection," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 94(12), pages 1927-1941.
    12. Yisha Xiang & David Coit & Qianmei Feng, 2013. "Subpopulations experiencing stochastic degradation: reliability modeling, burn-in, and preventive replacement optimization," IISE Transactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(4), pages 391-408.
    13. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2011. "Is it wise to protect false targets?," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 96(12), pages 1647-1656.
    14. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    15. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2013. "Is it wise to leave some false targets unprotected?," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 176-186.
    16. Peng, R. & Levitin, G. & Xie, M. & Ng, S.H., 2010. "Defending simple series and parallel systems with imperfect false targets," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 95(6), pages 679-688.
    17. Peng, R. & Zhai, Q.Q. & Levitin, G., 2016. "Defending a single object against an attacker trying to detect a subset of false targets," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 137-147.
    18. Kjell Hausken, 2014. "Choosing what to protect when attacker resources and asset valuations are uncertain," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 24(3), pages 23-44.
    19. Hausken, Kjell, 2006. "Income, interdependence, and substitution effects affecting incentives for security investment," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 629-665.
    20. R Peng & G Levitin & M Xie & S H Ng, 2011. "Optimal defence of single object with imperfect false targets," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 62(1), pages 134-141, January.
    21. Toshio Nakagawa, 2005. "Maintenance Theory of Reliability," Springer Series in Reliability Engineering, Springer, number 978-1-84628-221-8, March.
    22. Kjell Hausken & Jun Zhuang, 2016. "How companies and governments react to disasters," Journal of Risk and Reliability, , vol. 230(4), pages 417-426, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lin, Chen & Xiao, Hui & Kou, Gang & Peng, Rui, 2020. "Defending a series system with individual protection, overarching protection, and disinformation," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    2. Jamalzadeh, Saeed & Mettenbrink, Lily & Barker, Kash & González, Andrés D. & Radhakrishnan, Sridhar & Johansson, Jonas & Bessarabova, Elena, 2024. "Weaponized disinformation spread and its impact on multi-commodity critical infrastructure networks," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 243(C).
    3. Dui, Hongyan & Zheng, Xiaoqian & Wu, Shaomin, 2021. "Resilience analysis of maritime transportation systems based on importance measures," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    4. Li, Yijia & Hu, Xiaoxiao & Zhao, Peng, 2021. "On the reliability of a voting system under cyber attacks," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    5. Qiu, Qingan & Kou, Meng & Chen, Ke & Deng, Qiao & Kang, Fengming & Lin, Cong, 2021. "Optimal stopping problems for mission oriented systems considering time redundancy," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    6. Wu, Di & Yan, Xiangbin & Peng, Rui & Wu, Shaomin, 2020. "Risk-attitude-based defense strategy considering proactive strike, preventive strike and imperfect false targets," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    7. Zhang, Jing & Wang, Yan & Zhuang, Jun, 2021. "Modeling multi-target defender-attacker games with quantal response attack strategies," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    8. Lin, Chen & Xiao, Hui & Peng, Rui & Xiang, Yisha, 2021. "Optimal defense-attack strategies between M defenders and N attackers: A method based on cumulative prospect theory," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Qingqing Zhai & Rui Peng & Jun Zhuang, 2020. "Defender–Attacker Games with Asymmetric Player Utilities," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(2), pages 408-420, February.
    2. Zhang, Xiaoxiong & Ding, Song & Ge, Bingfeng & Xia, Boyuan & Pedrycz, Witold, 2021. "Resource allocation among multiple targets for a defender-attacker game with false targets consideration," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    3. Peng, R. & Zhai, Q.Q. & Levitin, G., 2016. "Defending a single object against an attacker trying to detect a subset of false targets," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 137-147.
    4. Lin, Chen & Xiao, Hui & Kou, Gang & Peng, Rui, 2020. "Defending a series system with individual protection, overarching protection, and disinformation," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    5. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2011. "Is it wise to protect false targets?," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 96(12), pages 1647-1656.
    6. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2013. "Is it wise to leave some false targets unprotected?," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 176-186.
    7. Hunt, Kyle & Zhuang, Jun, 2024. "A review of attacker-defender games: Current state and paths forward," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 313(2), pages 401-417.
    8. Ye, Zhi-Sheng & Peng, Rui & Wang, Wenbin, 2017. "Defense and attack of performance-sharing common bus systemsAuthor-Name: Zhai, Qingqing," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 256(3), pages 962-975.
    9. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2012. "Strategic Defense And Attack For Series And Parallel Reliability Systems: Comment," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(5), pages 507-515, October.
    10. Chen, Die & Xu, Maochao & Shi, Weidong, 2018. "Defending a cyber system with early warning mechanism," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 224-234.
    11. Gao, Kaiye & Yan, Xiangbin & Liu, Xiang-dong & Peng, Rui, 2019. "Object defence of a single object with preventive strike of random effect," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 209-219.
    12. Rui Peng & Di Wu & Mengyao Sun & Shaomin Wu, 2021. "An attack-defense game on interdependent networks," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 72(10), pages 2331-2341, October.
    13. Wu, Di & Xiao, Hui & Peng, Rui, 2018. "Object defense with preventive strike and false targets," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 76-80.
    14. Yan, Xihong & Ren, Xiaorong & Nie, Xiaofeng, 2022. "A budget allocation model for domestic airport network protection," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 82(PB).
    15. Abdolmajid Yolmeh & Melike Baykal-Gürsoy, 2019. "Two-Stage Invest–Defend Game: Balancing Strategic and Operational Decisions," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 16(1), pages 46-66, March.
    16. Mo, Huadong & Xie, Min & Levitin, Gregory, 2015. "Optimal resource distribution between protection and redundancy considering the time and uncertainties of attacks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 243(1), pages 200-210.
    17. Bose, Gautam & Konrad, Kai A., 2020. "Devil take the hindmost: Deflecting attacks to other defenders," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    18. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2009. "Intelligence and impact contests in systems with redundancy, false targets, and partial protection," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 94(12), pages 1927-1941.
    19. Xiao, Hui & Shi, Daimin & Ding, Yi & Peng, Rui, 2016. "Optimal loading and protection of multi-state systems considering performance sharing mechanism," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 88-95.
    20. Wu, Di & Yan, Xiangbin & Peng, Rui & Wu, Shaomin, 2020. "Risk-attitude-based defense strategy considering proactive strike, preventive strike and imperfect false targets," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:reensy:v:193:y:2020:i:c:s0951832018314686. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/reliability-engineering-and-system-safety .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.