Choosing what to protect when attacker resources and asset valuations are uncertain
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Hausken, Kjell, 2017. "Defense and attack for interdependent systems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 256(2), pages 582-591.
- Ríos Insua, David & Cano, Javier & Pellot, Michael & Ortega, Ricardo, 2016. "Multithreat multisite protection: A security case study," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 252(3), pages 888-899.
More about this item
Keywordsassets; defense; attack; game theory; uncertainty; resources; valuations; contest success function; optimization.;
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