Secrecy And Deception At Equilibrium, With Applications To Anti-Terrorism Resource Allocation
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References listed on IDEAS
- Jurgen Brauer & John Tepper Marlin, 1992. "Converting Resources from Military to Non-military Uses," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 145-164, Fall.
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- Nakao, Keisuke, 2017. "Denial vs. Punishment: Strategies Shape War, but War Itself Affects Strategies," MPRA Paper 81418, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Zhang, Chi & Ramirez-Marquez, José Emmanuel & Wang, Jianhui, 2015. "Critical infrastructure protection using secrecy – A discrete simultaneous game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 242(1), pages 212-221.
- Wang, Xiaofang & Zhuang, Jun, 2011. "Balancing congestion and security in the presence of strategic applicants with private information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 212(1), pages 100-111, July.
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- Kjell Hausken, 2014. "Choosing what to protect when attacker resources and asset valuations are uncertain," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Organization and Management, vol. 3, pages 23-44.
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- Hausken, Kjell, 2017. "Defense and attack for interdependent systems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 256(2), pages 582-591.
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- Kjell Hausken & Jun Zhuang, 2011. "Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T -Period Game," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 8(1), pages 46-70, March.
- Paulson, Elisabeth C. & Linkov, Igor & Keisler, Jeffrey M., 2016. "A game theoretic model for resource allocation among countermeasures with multiple attributes," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 252(2), pages 610-622.
- Nikoofal, Mohammad E. & Zhuang, Jun, 2015. "On the value of exposure and secrecy of defense system: First-mover advantage vs. robustness," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 246(1), pages 320-330.
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More about this item
KeywordsSecrecy and deception; Truthful disclosure; Homeland security; Resource allocation; Game theory;
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