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Defence of homogeneous parallel multi-state systems subject to two sequential attacks

Author

Listed:
  • K Hausken
  • G Levitin

Abstract

Single and double attacks are compared against a system consisting of identical parallel elements providing performance redundancy in a multi-state system. By destroying elements an attacker tries to maximize the expected damage caused by the reduction of the cumulative system performance. The attacker has a constrained resource which is distributed optimally between two attacks. The optimal number of attacked elements in each attack is determined. The attacker observes which elements are destroyed in the first attack and does not attack them in the second attack. First the optimal attack strategy against a system with a fixed number of elements is analysed. Thereafter a minmax two-period game between the attacker and the defender is considered. The defender distributes its constrained resource between deploying redundant elements and protecting them against the attack in the first period to minimize the expected damage. The attacker chooses its strategies in the second period to maximize the expected damage. A model and a methodology for finding the optimal defence and attack strategies are suggested. Illustrative examples of the optimal attack and defence are presented.

Suggested Citation

  • K Hausken & G Levitin, 2010. "Defence of homogeneous parallel multi-state systems subject to two sequential attacks," Journal of Risk and Reliability, , vol. 224(3), pages 171-183, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:risrel:v:224:y:2010:i:3:p:171-183
    DOI: 10.1243/1748006XJRR317
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April.
    2. Detlof von Winterfeldt & Terrence M. O'Sullivan, 2006. "Should We Protect Commercial Airplanes Against Surface-to-Air Missile Attacks by Terrorists?," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 3(2), pages 63-75, June.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2012. "Strategic Defense And Attack For Series And Parallel Reliability Systems: Comment," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(5), pages 507-515, October.
    3. Yun Zhang & Zhengguo Xu & Xinli Wang & Jiangang Lu & Youxian Sun, 2014. "Single minimal path based backup path for multi-state network," Journal of Risk and Reliability, , vol. 228(2), pages 152-165, April.
    4. Chen, Shun & Zhao, Xudong & Chen, Zhilong & Hou, Benwei & Wu, Yipeng, 2022. "A game-theoretic method to optimize allocation of defensive resource to protect urban water treatment plants against physical attacks," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 36(C).
    5. Qingqing Zhai & Rui Peng & Jun Zhuang, 2020. "Defender–Attacker Games with Asymmetric Player Utilities," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(2), pages 408-420, February.
    6. J Setréus & D Månsson & P Hilber & S Arnborg, 2012. "Component ranking in Great Britain transmission system based on either equipment failures or sabotage," Journal of Risk and Reliability, , vol. 226(1), pages 96-108, February.

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