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Taxation and political stability

  • Mutascu, Mihai
  • Tiwari, Aviral
  • Estrada, Fernando

The present study is, in particular, an attempt to test the relationship between tax level and political stability by using some economic control variables and to see the relationship among government effectiveness, corruption, and GDP. For the purpose, we used the GMM (1991) and GMM system (1998), using a country-level panel data from 112 countries for the period 1997 to 2010. The main results show that political stability is not the key for the tax policy, under the control of political regime durability the taxes as percent in GDP having consistent sinusoidal tendency, by cubic type.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36855/1/MPRA_paper_36855.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 36855.

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Date of creation: Jul 2011
Date of revision: Feb 2012
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:36855
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  1. Sören Blomquist & Luca Micheletto, 2005. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation when Government’s and Agents’ Preferences Differ," CESifo Working Paper Series 1429, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Estrada, Fernando, 2010. "Devouring the Leviathan: fiscal policy and public expenditure in Colombia," MPRA Paper 21981, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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  9. Volkerink, Bjørn & Haan, Jakob de, 1999. "Political and institutional determinants of the tax mix : an empirical investigation for OECD countries," Research Report 99E05, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
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  19. Arellano, Manuel & Bond, Stephen, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 277-97, April.
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