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The political economy of tax projections

Author Info

  • Ivo Bischoff

    ()

  • Wolfgang Gohout

    ()

Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10797-008-9103-y
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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

Volume (Year): 17 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 133-150

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Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:17:y:2010:i:2:p:133-150
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915

Keywords: Tax projections; Political parties; Budget process; Public deficits; Fiscal discipline; Fiscal transparency; H 72; D 72;

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  1. Volkerink, Bjorn & De Haan, Jakob, 2001. "Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy: New Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 109(3-4), pages 221-42, December.
  2. Tilman Brück & Andreas Stephan, 2006. "Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with their Budget Deficit Forecasts?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 3-15, 02.
  3. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, . "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Working Papers 121, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  4. Alesina, Alberto F & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," CEPR Discussion Papers 269, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Alan J. Auerbach, 1996. "Dynamic Revenue Estimation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 141-157, Winter.
  6. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
  7. Huber, Gerald & Kocher, Martin & Sutter, Matthias, 2003. "Government Strength, Power Dispersion in Governments and Budget Deficits in OECD-Countries: A Voting Power Approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 333-50, September.
  8. Hettich, W. & Winer, S.L., 1993. "The Political Economy of Taxation," Papers 8, Carleton - Business Administration.
  9. Alesina, Alberto & Perotti, Roberto, 1996. "Fiscal Discipline and the Budget Process," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 401-07, May.
  10. Nannestad, Peter & Paldam, Martin, 1994. "The VP-Function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 213-45, June.
  11. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 265-286.
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Cited by:

  1. Simon Luechinger & Christoph Schaltegger, 2013. "Fiscal rules, budget deficits and budget projections," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 20(5), pages 785-807, October.
  2. Florian Chatagny, 2015. "Incentive Effects of Fiscal Rules on the Finance Minister's Behaviour: Evidence from Revenue Projections in Swiss Cantons," CESifo Working Paper Series 5223, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Javier J. Perez & Rossana Merola, 2012. "Fiscal forecast errors: governments vs independent agencies?," EcoMod2012 4694, EcoMod.
  4. Jeffrey A. Frankel & Jesse Schreger, 2016. "Bias in Official Fiscal Forecasts: Can Private Forecasts Help?," NBER Working Papers 22349, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Estrada, Fernando & Mutascu, Mihai & Tiwari, Aviral, 2011. "Estabilidad política y tributación
    [Taxation and political stability]    ," MPRA Paper 32414, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Thiess Buettner & Bjoern Kauder, 2015. "Political biases despite external expert participation? An empirical analysis of tax revenue forecasts in Germany," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 287-307, September.
  7. Florian Chatagny & Nils Soguel, 2012. "The effect of tax revenue budgeting errors on fiscal balance: evidence from the Swiss cantons," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 319-337, June.
  8. Jochimsen, Beate Regina & Lehmann, Robert, 2015. "Do OECD countries cheat with their national tax revenue forecasts?," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113089, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  9. Beate Jochimsen & Robert Lehmann, 2015. "On the political economy of national taxrevenue forecasts – Evidence from OECD countries," Ifo Working Paper Series Ifo Working Paper No. 198, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
  10. Estrada, Fernando, 2013. "Estabilidad política y poder fiscal
    [political stability and tax power]    ," MPRA Paper 58458, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2014.
  11. Boysen-Hogrefe, Jens, 2014. "Passt die mittelfristige Steuerschätzung zur Finanzplanung der Länder?," Kiel Policy Brief 78, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  12. Mutascu, Mihai & Tiwari, Aviral & Estrada, Fernando, 2011. "Taxation and political stability," MPRA Paper 36855, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Feb 2012.

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