IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/itaxpf/v17y2010i2p133-150.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The political economy of tax projections

Author

Listed:
  • Ivo Bischoff

    ()

  • Wolfgang Gohout

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Ivo Bischoff & Wolfgang Gohout, 2010. "The political economy of tax projections," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(2), pages 133-150, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:17:y:2010:i:2:p:133-150
    DOI: 10.1007/s10797-008-9103-y
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10797-008-9103-y
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Volkerink, Bjorn & De Haan, Jakob, 2001. "Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy: New Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 109(3-4), pages 221-242, December.
    2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.),Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482, Elsevier.
    3. Nannestad, Peter & Paldam, Martin, 1994. "The VP-Function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 213-245, June.
    4. Tilman Brück & Andreas Stephan, 2006. "Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with their Budget Deficit Forecasts?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 3-15, February.
    5. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    6. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 265-286.
    7. Alesina, Alberto & Perotti, Roberto, 1996. "Fiscal Discipline and the Budget Process," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 401-407, May.
    8. Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 37-49, March.
    9. Huber, Gerald & Kocher, Martin & Sutter, Matthias, 2003. "Government Strength, Power Dispersion in Governments and Budget Deficits in OECD-Countries: A Voting Power Approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 333-350, September.
    10. Hettich, W. & Winer, S.L., 1993. "The Political Economy of Taxation," Papers 8, Carleton - Business Administration.
    11. Alan J. Auerbach, 1996. "Dynamic Revenue Estimation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 141-157, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Thiess Buettner & Bjoern Kauder, 2015. "Political biases despite external expert participation? An empirical analysis of tax revenue forecasts in Germany," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 287-307, September.
    2. Boysen-Hogrefe, Jens, 2014. "Passt die mittelfristige Steuerschätzung zur Finanzplanung der Länder?," Kiel Policy Brief 78, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    3. Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke & Christoph Schinke, 2017. "Manipulating Fiscal Forecasts: Evidence from the German States," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 73(2), pages 213-236, June.
    4. Chatagny, Florian, 2015. "Incentive effects of fiscal rules on the finance minister's behavior: Evidence from revenue projections in Swiss Cantons," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 184-200.
    5. Beate Jochimsen & Robert Lehmann, 2017. "On the political economy of national tax revenue forecasts: evidence from OECD countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(3), pages 211-230, March.
    6. Jeffrey A. Frankel & Jesse Schreger, 2016. "Bias in Official Fiscal Forecasts: Can Private Forecasts Help?," NBER Working Papers 22349, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Rossana Merola & Javier J. Pérez, 2012. "Fiscal forecast errors: governments vs independent agencies?," Working Papers 1233, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
    8. Frank Bohn & Francisco José Veiga, 2019. "Political Budget Forecast Cycles," NIPE Working Papers 12/2019, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    9. Mutascu, Mihai & Tiwari, Aviral & Estrada, Fernando, 2011. "Taxation and political stability," MPRA Paper 36855, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Feb 2012.
    10. Florian Chatagny & Nils Soguel, 2012. "The effect of tax revenue budgeting errors on fiscal balance: evidence from the Swiss cantons," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(3), pages 319-337, June.
    11. Frank Bohn, 2019. "Political budget cycles, incumbency advantage, and propaganda," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 43-70, March.
    12. Estrada, Fernando & Mutascu, Mihai & Tiwari, Aviral, 2011. "Estabilidad política y tributación [Taxation and political stability]," MPRA Paper 32414, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke & Fabian Ruthardt & Christoph Schinke, 2017. "Beschönigen Landesregierungen fiskalische Kennziffern?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 70(06), pages 36-40, March.
    14. Ademmer, Martin & Boysen-Hogrefe, Jens, 2019. "The impact of forecast errors on fiscal planning and debt accumulation," Kiel Working Papers 2123, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    15. Timo Wollmershäuser, 2017. "Die Konjunkturprognosen der Gemeinschaftsdiagnose und des Bundeswirtschaftsministeriums im Vergleich," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 70(03), pages 40-45, February.
    16. Simon Luechinger & Christoph Schaltegger, 2013. "Fiscal rules, budget deficits and budget projections," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(5), pages 785-807, October.
    17. Bernardino Benito & María-Dolores Guillamón & Francisco Bastida, 2015. "Budget Forecast Deviations in Municipal Governments: Determinants and Implications," Australian Accounting Review, CPA Australia, vol. 25(1), pages 45-70, March.
    18. Beate Jochimsen & Robert Lehmann, 2017. "On the political economy of national tax revenue forecasts: evidence from OECD countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(3), pages 211-230, March.
    19. Frank Bohn & Francisco José Veiga, 2019. "Political Budget Forecast cycles," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2019-13-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
    20. Estrada, Fernando, 2013. "Estabilidad política y poder fiscal [political stability and tax power]," MPRA Paper 58458, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2014.
    21. Boukari, Mamadou & Veiga, Francisco José, 2018. "Disentangling political and institutional determinants of budget forecast errors: A comparative approach," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 1030-1045.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:17:y:2010:i:2:p:133-150. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.