Contracting Food Safety Strategies in Hybrid Governance Structures
The study consider the relationship between food safety strategies and organizational choice. The poultry sector provides an insightful example to illustrate and to analyse this field. Furthermore, European Union regulation requires change in safety related technologies (i.e., the ban of Antibiotic Growth Promoters), positing several research questions: the focus here is on the possibilities of adoption of new productive techniques when the link between the growing stage and the processing stage is based on contractual relationship. The choice of governance structure is examined and the causal nexus between contract performance and food safety outcomes is stressed. An empirical analysis of growers’ preferences for contract attributes is proposed as a support for the negotiation and the realization of food safety strategies.
|Date of creation:||01 Dec 2007|
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