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Structural Reforms and Elections: Evidence from a World-Wide New Dataset

Author

Listed:
  • Alberto F. Alesina
  • Davide Furceri
  • Jonathan D. Ostry
  • Chris Papageorgiou
  • Dennis P. Quinn

Abstract

We assemble two unique databases. One is on reforms in domestic finance, external finance, trade, product markets and labor markets, which covers 90 advanced and developing economies from 1973 to 2014. The other is on electoral results and timing of elections. In the 66 democracies considered in the paper, we show that liberalizing reforms engender benefits for the economy, but they materialize only gradually over time. Partly because of this delayed effect, and possibly because voters are impatient or do not anticipate future benefits, liberalizing reforms are costly to incumbents when implemented close to elections. We also find that the electoral effects depend on the state of the economy at the time of reform: reforms are penalized during contractions; liberalizing reforms undertaken in expansions are often rewarded. Voters seem to attribute current economic conditions to the reforms without fully internalizing the delay that it takes for reforms to bear fruit.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto F. Alesina & Davide Furceri & Jonathan D. Ostry & Chris Papageorgiou & Dennis P. Quinn, 2020. "Structural Reforms and Elections: Evidence from a World-Wide New Dataset," NBER Working Papers 26720, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26720
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    Cited by:

    1. Jakob de Haan & Rasmus Wiese, 2020. "The Impact of Product and Labour Market Reform on Growth: Evidence for OECD Countries Based on Local Projections," CESifo Working Paper Series 8393, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • O47 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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