Interviewing in Two-Sided Matching Markets
We introduce the interview assignment problem, which generalizes the one-to-one matching model of Gale and Shapley (1962) by introducing a stage of costly information acquisition. Agents may learn preferences over partners via costly interviews. Although there exist multiple equilibria where all agents receive the same number of interviews, efficiency depends on overlap -- the number of common interview partners among agents. We prove the equilibria with the highest degree of overlap yields the highest probability of being matched. The analysis suggests that institutions which ration interviews or create labor market segmentation may lead to greater efficiency in information acquisition activities.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Haeinger, Guillaume & Wooders, Myrna, 2003.
"Decentralized Job Matching,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
688, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Federico Echenique & Jorge Oviedo, 2004.
"A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets,"
Game Theory and Information
- Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2006. "A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 233-273, June.
- Jorge Oviedo & Federico Echenique, 2005. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," 2005 Meeting Papers 233, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2003. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," Working Papers 1185, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Federico Echenique & Jorge Oviedo, 2003. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000374, David K. Levine.
- Hoppe, Heidrun C. & Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2006.
"The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Heidrun C. Hoppe & Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2009. "The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 253-281.
- Hoppe, Heidrun C. & Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2005. "The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 85, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Chakraborty, Archishman & Citanna, Alessandro & Ostrovsky, Michael, 2010. "Two-sided matching with interdependent values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 85-105, January.
- lones smith & hector chade, 2004.
Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings
64, Econometric Society.
- Lones Smith & Hector Chade, 2004. "Simultaneous Search," 2004 Meeting Papers 25, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Hector Chade & Lones Smith, . "Simultaneous Search," Working Papers 2168591, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.
- Hector Chade & Lones Smith, 2006. "Simultaneous Search," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1556, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Hector Chade & Lones Smith, 2005. "Simultaneous Search," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 172782000000000033, www.najecon.org.
- Jens Josephson & Joel Shapiro, 2008.
"Interviews and Adverse Selection,"
349, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Paul Schweinzer, 2008. "Labour market recruiting with intermediaries," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 119-127, June.
- Burdett, Kenneth, 1996. "Truncated means and variances," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 263-267, September.
- Jan Eeckhout & Philipp Kircher, 2010.
"Sorting and decentralized price competition,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
29705, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Alp Atakan, 2005.
"Assortative Matching with Explicit Search Costs,"
2005 Meeting Papers
218, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Mongell, Susan & Roth, Alvin E, 1991. "Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 441-64, June.
- Hideo Konishi & M. Utku Ünver, 2003.
"Credible Group Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems,"
Game Theory and Information
0309005, EconWPA, revised 06 Sep 2003.
- Konishi, Hideo & Unver, M. Utku, 2006. "Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 57-80, July.
- Hideo Konishi & M. Utku Unver, 2003. "Credible Group-Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 570, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 19 Jan 2005.
- Rachel E. Kranton & Deborah F. Minehart, 2000. "Networks versus Vertical Integration," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(3), pages 570-601, Autumn.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
- Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14922. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.