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College choice, selection, and allocation mechanisms: A structural empirical analysis

Author

Listed:
  • José-Raimundo Carvalho

    (UFC - Universidade Federal do Ceará = Federal University of Ceará)

  • Thierry Magnac

    (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Qizhou Xiong

    (OVGU - Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg = Otto-von-Guericke University [Magdeburg])

Abstract

We use rich microeconomic data on performance and choices of students at college entry to analyze interactions between the selection mechanism, eliciting college preferences through exams, and the allocation mechanism. We set up a framework in which success probabilities and student preferences are shown to be identified from data on their choices and their exam grades under exclusion restrictions and support conditions. The counterfactuals we consider balance the severity of congestion and the quality of the match between schools and students. Moving to deferred acceptance or inverting the timing of choices and exams are shown to increase welfare. Redistribution among students and among schools is also sizeable in all counterfactual experiments.

Suggested Citation

  • José-Raimundo Carvalho & Thierry Magnac & Qizhou Xiong, 2019. "College choice, selection, and allocation mechanisms: A structural empirical analysis," Post-Print hal-05086083, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05086083
    DOI: 10.3982/QE951
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05086083v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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