Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism
The history and organization of the membership recruitment process of American sororities is studied. Like entry-level labor markets studied previously, this process experienced failures that led to the adaptation of a centralized matching procedure in which a matching is determined on the basis of preference lists submitted by the agents. Analysis of the rules of the match and of preference lists from twenty-one matches reveals an unstable matching procedure that gives agents incentives to behave strategically. The analysis also shows how the agents act on these incentives and how the resulting strategic behavior has contributed to the longevity of the matching system and to the stability of the resulting matches. Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association.
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Volume (Year): 81 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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