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No Pass No Drive: Education and Allocation of Time

  • Barua, Rashmi

    ()

    (Jawaharlal Nehru University)

  • Vidal-Fernández, Marian

    ()

    (University of Sydney)

Do negative incentives or sticks in education improve student outcomes? Since the late 1980s, several U.S. states have introduced No Pass No Drive (NPND) laws that set minimum academic requirements for teenagers to obtain driving licenses. Using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) and Monitoring the Future (MTF), we exploit variation across state, time, and cohort to show that NPND laws led to a 6.4 percentage point increase in the probability of graduating from high school among black males. Further, we show that NPND laws were effective in reducing truancy and increased time allocated to school-work at the expense of leisure and work.

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File URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp6464.pdf
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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 6464.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2012
Publication status: published in: Journal of Human Capital, 2014, 8(4), 399-431
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6464
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  1. Leuven, Edwin & Oosterbeek, Hessel & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2003. "The Effect of Financial Rewards on Students' Achievements: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 3921, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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  8. Gary S. Becker & William Hubbard & Kevin Murphy, 2010. "Explaining the Worldwide Boom in Higher Education of Women," Working Papers 2010-009, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
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  16. Jason M. Lindo & Nicholas J. Sanders & Philip Oreopoulos, 2008. "Ability, Gender, and Performance Standards: Evidence from Academic Probation," NBER Working Papers 14261, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  18. Jacob, Brian A., 2005. "Accountability, incentives and behavior: the impact of high-stakes testing in the Chicago Public Schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(5-6), pages 761-796, June.
  19. Vidal-Fernández Marian, 2011. "The Effect of Minimum Academic Requirements to Participate in Sports on High School Graduation," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-21, August.
  20. Edwin Leuven & Hessel Oosterbeek & Bas van der Klaauw, 2004. "The e ect of financial rewards on students achievement: Evidence from a randomized experiment," HEW 0410002, EconWPA.
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