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No Pass No Drive: Education and Allocation of Time

Author

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  • Barua, Rashmi

    () (Jawaharlal Nehru University)

  • Vidal-Fernández, Marian

    () (University of Sydney)

Abstract

Do negative incentives or sticks in education improve student outcomes? Since the late 1980s, several U.S. states have introduced No Pass No Drive (NPND) laws that set minimum academic requirements for teenagers to obtain driving licenses. Using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) and Monitoring the Future (MTF), we exploit variation across state, time, and cohort to show that NPND laws led to a 6.4 percentage point increase in the probability of graduating from high school among black males. Further, we show that NPND laws were effective in reducing truancy and increased time allocated to school-work at the expense of leisure and work.

Suggested Citation

  • Barua, Rashmi & Vidal-Fernández, Marian, 2012. "No Pass No Drive: Education and Allocation of Time," IZA Discussion Papers 6464, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6464
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Lichtman-Sadot, Shirlee, 2016. "Improving academic performance through conditional benefits: Open/closed campus policies in high school and student outcomes," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 95-112.
    2. Dara N. Lee, 2013. "The Impact of Repealing Sunday Closing Laws on Educational Attainment," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 48(2), pages 286-310.
    3. repec:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/696204 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Ben Ost & Weixiang Pan & Douglas Webber, 2018. "The Returns to College Persistence for Marginal Students: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from University Dismissal Policies," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(3), pages 779-805.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    negative incentives; education; allocation of time; dropout; No Pass No Drive laws;

    JEL classification:

    • J08 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics Policies
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education

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