The Global Crisis: Why Regulators Resist Reforms
An Anglo-American regulatory ¡¥culture¡¦ became associated with 30 years of worldwide economic reforms, global growth and monetary stability. American and British officials identified major sources of instability in their own financial markets before 2007 but remained non-interventionist, invoking the concepts of virtuous markets and moral hazard. They also ignored the policy defects revealed by past crises. Despite record banking losses and fiscal imbalances during the global crisis, their current resistance to regulatory reforms is supported by a powerful political and business consensus.
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