The Global Crisis: Why Regulators Resist Reforms
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsNon-Interventionism; Basel; Virtuous Markets; Moral Hazard; Regulatory Culture;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2010-05-02 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2010-05-02 (Central Banking)
- NEP-FDG-2010-05-02 (Financial Development & Growth)
- NEP-HIS-2010-05-02 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-PKE-2010-05-02 (Post Keynesian Economics)
- NEP-REG-2010-05-02 (Regulation)
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