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On the Determinants of Labour Market Institutions: Rent-sharing vs. Social Insurance

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  • Agell, Jonas

    () (Department of Economics)

Abstract

What determines the structure of labour market institutions? This paper argues that common explanations based on rent sharing are incomplete; unions, job protection, and egalitarian pay structures may have as much to do with social insurance of otherwise uninsurable risks as with rent sharing and vested interests. In support of this more benign complementary hypothesis the paper presents a range of historical, theoretical, and cross-country regression evidence. The social insurance perspective changes substantially the assessment of often-proposed reforms of European labour market institutions. The benefits from eliminating labour market rigidities have to be set against the costs of reduced coverage of human capital related risk. The paper also argues that it is unclear whether the forces of globalisation, and the new economy, will really force countries to make their labour markets more flexible. While these phenomena may increase the efficiency costs of existing institutions, they may also make people more willing to pay a high premium to preserve institutions that provide insurance.

Suggested Citation

  • Agell, Jonas, 2000. "On the Determinants of Labour Market Institutions: Rent-sharing vs. Social Insurance," Working Paper Series 2000:16, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2000_016
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Schob, Ronnie, 2002. "Public Profit Sharing," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 523-541.
    2. Thomas Eichner & Andreas Wagener, 2002. "Increases in Risk and the Welfare State," CESifo Working Paper Series 685, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Andersen, Torben M., 2005. "Product market integration, wage dispersion and unemployment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 379-406, June.
    4. Wolfgang Ochel, 2002. "International Comparisons and Transfer of Labour Market Institutions," CESifo Working Paper Series 788, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Labour market institutions; comparative historical evidence; Sweden; Massachusetts; rent seeking; social insurance; union models; cross-country regressions; openness; linguistic fractionalisation;

    JEL classification:

    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
    • N30 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - General, International, or Comparative

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