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Welfare-State Retrenchment: The Partisan Effect Revisited

Author

Listed:
  • Bruno Amable

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Donatella Gatti

    (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord (ancienne affiliation) - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jan Schumacher

    (Department of Economics - UR - Universität Regensburg)

Abstract

This paper aims to shed light on the role of the 'ideology'of political parties in shaping the evolution of the welfare state in 18 developed democracies, by providing empirical ...ndings on the determinants of social programs entitlements and social spending over the period 1981-1999. The paper shows that structural change is a major determinant of the extent of social protection. Our results suggest that overall spending is driven up by structural change. On the other hand, strong structural change has a negative influence on welfare entitlements measured by the net rate of sickness insurance. Partisan influence plays an important role in the dynamics of the welfare state. Left-wing governments strengthen the positive effect of shocks on aggregate social expenditure while right-wing governments undertake even stronger cutbacks in replacement rates as a reaction to structural change.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Amable & Donatella Gatti & Jan Schumacher, 2006. "Welfare-State Retrenchment: The Partisan Effect Revisited," Post-Print halshs-00176295, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00176295
    DOI: 10.1093/oxrep/grj025
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Welfare State; ideology; structural change;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
    • J8 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards

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