IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/oxford/v22y2006i3p426-444.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Welfare-State Retrenchment: The Partisan Effect Revisited

Author

Listed:
  • Bruno Amable
  • Donatella Gatti
  • Jan Schumacher

Abstract

This paper aims to shed light on the role of the 'ideology' of political parties in shaping the evolution of the welfare state in 18 developed democracies, by providing empirical findings on the determinants of social-programme entitlements and social spending over the period 1981--99. The paper shows that structural change is a major determinant of the extent of social protection. Our results suggest that overall spending is driven up by structural change. On the other hand, strong structural change has a negative influence on welfare entitlements measured by the net rate of sickness insurance. Partisan influence plays an important role in the dynamics of the welfare state. Left-wing governments strengthen the positive effect of shocks on aggregate social expenditure, while right-wing governments undertake even stronger cutbacks in replacement rates as a reaction to structural change. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Amable & Donatella Gatti & Jan Schumacher, 2006. "Welfare-State Retrenchment: The Partisan Effect Revisited," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 426-444, Autumn.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:22:y:2006:i:3:p:426-444
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Torsten Persson, 2002. "Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 883-905, May.
    2. Tito Boeri & Giuseppe Nicoletti & Stefano Scarpetta, "undated". "Regulation and Labour Market Performance," Working Papers 158, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    3. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics,in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482 Elsevier.
    4. Nickell, Stephen & Layard, Richard, 1999. "Labor market institutions and economic performance," Handbook of Labor Economics,in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 46, pages 3029-3084 Elsevier.
    5. Abraham, Katharine G & Katz, Lawrence F, 1986. "Cyclical Unemployment: Sectoral Shifts or Aggregate Disturbances?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 507-522, June.
    6. Lilien, David M, 1982. "Sectoral Shifts and Cyclical Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(4), pages 777-793, August.
    7. Blanchard, Olivier & Wolfers, Justin, 2000. "The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(462), pages 1-33, March.
    8. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March.
    9. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2003. "How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions and Economic Policies?," Working Papers 251, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    10. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "The size and scope of government:: Comparative politics with rational politicians," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 699-735, April.
    11. Braumoeller, Bear F., 2004. "Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 58(04), pages 807-820, October.
    12. Torben M. Andersen, 2003. "European integration and the welfare state," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 16(1), pages 1-19, February.
    13. Amable, Bruno & Gatti, Donatella, 2004. "The Political Economy of Job Protection and Income Redistribution," IZA Discussion Papers 1404, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    14. Dani Rodrik, 1998. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(5), pages 997-1032, October.
    15. Alberto Alesina & Edward Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, 2001. "Why Doesn't The US Have a European-Style Welfare State?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1933, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    16. Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti & Roberto Perotti & Massimo Rostagno, 2002. "Electoral Systems and Public Spending," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(2), pages 609-657.
    17. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-1155, December.
    18. repec:cup:apsrev:v:72:y:1978:i:04:p:1243-1261_15 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. A. B. Atkinson, 1999. "The Economic Consequences of Rolling Back the Welfare State," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011719, March.
    20. Amable, Bruno, 2003. "The Diversity of Modern Capitalism," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199261147.
    21. Alesina, Alberto & Wacziarg, Romain, 1998. "Openness, country size and government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 305-321, September.
    22. Alberto Alesina & Edward Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, 2001. "Why Doesn't the US Have a European-Style Welfare System?," NBER Working Papers 8524, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Donatella Gatti, 2009. "Macroeconomic effects of ownership structure in OECD countries ," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(5), pages 901-928, October.
    2. Bruno Amable & Donatella Gatti & Elvire Guillaud, 2008. "How does party fractionalization convey preferences for redistribution in parliamentary democracies?," CEPN Working Papers halshs-00586259, HAL.
    3. Michaël Zemmour, 2012. "Tax competition and the move from insurance to assistance," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12090r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Mar 2013.
    4. Osterloh, Steffen, 2012. "Words speak louder than actions: The impact of politics on economic performance," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 318-336.
    5. Thibault Darcillon, 2012. "Do Interactions between Finance and Labor Market Institutions Affect Wage Distribution?," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12089, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    6. Bruno Amable & Donatella Gatti & Elvire Guillaud, 2008. "How does Party Fractionalization convey Preferences for Redistribution in Parliamentary Democracies ?," Post-Print halshs-00348878, HAL.
    7. David R. Howell & Miriam Rehm, 2009. "Unemployment compensation and high European unemployment: a reassessment with new benefit indicators," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 60-93, Spring.
    8. Amable, Bruno & Demmou, Lilas & Gatti, Donatella, 2007. "Employment Performance and Institutions: New Answers to an Old Question," IZA Discussion Papers 2731, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    9. Darcillon Thibault, 2015. "Corporate governance reforms and political partisanship: an empirical analysis in 16 OECD countries," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(4), pages 661-696, December.
    10. Thibault Darcillon, 2013. "What Causes Labor-Market Volatility? The Role of Finance and Welfare State Institutions," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13070, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    11. Waltraud Schelkle, 2012. "Collapsing Worlds and Varieties of welfare capitalism: In search of a new political economy of welfare," LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series 54, European Institute, LSE.
    12. Bruno Amable & Donatella Gatti, 2005. "The political economy of job protection and income redistribution," Working Papers halshs-00590841, HAL.
    13. Boyer, Robert, 2011. "Post-keynésiens et régulationnistes :Une alternative à la crise de l’économie standard ?," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 10.
    14. Troeger, Vera, 2012. "De Facto Capital Mobility, Equality, and Tax Policy in Open Economies," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 84, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    15. Schelkle, Waltraud, 2012. "Collapsing worlds and varieties of welfare capitalism: in search of a new political economy of welfare," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 53194, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    16. Amable, Bruno & Azizi, Karim, 2011. "Varieties of capitalism and varieties of macroeconomic policy. Are some economies more procyclical than others?," MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/6, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    17. Wang, Jinxian & Van Vliet, Olaf & Goudswaard, Kees, 2015. "Social assistance benefits and European coordination," MPRA Paper 66147, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Bruno Amable & Donatella Gatti & Elvire Guillaud, 2008. "How does party fractionalization convey preferences for redistribution in parliamentary democracies?," Working Papers halshs-00586259, HAL.
    19. Thibault Darcillon, 2011. "Political Partisanship and Financial Reforms in Advanced Countries," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11063, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    20. Robert Boyer, 2007. "Growth strategies and poverty reduction: the institutional complementarity hypothesis," Working Papers halshs-00587703, HAL.
    21. Obinger, Herbert & Starke, Peter, 2014. "Welfare state transformation: Convergence and the rise of the supply side model," TranState Working Papers 180, University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597: Transformations of the State.
    22. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00639840 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Bruno Amable & Lilas Demmou & Donatella Gatti, 2006. "Institutions, unemployment and inactivity in the OECD countries," Working Papers halshs-00590495, HAL.
    24. Robert Boyer, 2007. "Growth strategies and poverty reduction: the institutional complementarity hypothesis," PSE Working Papers halshs-00587703, HAL.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
    • J8 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:22:y:2006:i:3:p:426-444. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/oxrep .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.