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New Financial Stability Governance Structures and Central Banks

Author

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  • Rochelle M. Edge
  • J. Nellie Liang

Abstract

We evaluate the institutional frameworks developed to implement time-varying macroprudential policies in 58 countries. We focus on new financial stability committees (FSCs) that have grown dramatically in number since the global financial crisis, and their interaction with central banks, and infer countries’ revealed preferences for effectiveness versus political economy considerations. Using cluster analysis, we find that only one-quarter of FSCs have both good processes and good tools to implement macroprudential actions, and that instead most FSCs have been designed to improve communication and coordination among existing regulators. We also find that central banks are not especially able to take macroprudential actions when FSCs are not set up to do so. We conclude that about one-half of the countries do not have structures to take or direct actions and avoid risks of policy inertia. Rather countries’ decisions appear to be consistent with strengthening the political legitimacy of macroprudential policies with prominent roles for the ministry of finance and avoiding placing additional powers in central banks that already are strong in microprudential supervision and have high political independence for monetary policy. The evidence suggests that countries are placing a relatively low weight on the ability of policy institutions to take action and a high weight on political economy considerations in developing their financial stability governance structures.

Suggested Citation

  • Rochelle M. Edge & J. Nellie Liang, 2019. "New Financial Stability Governance Structures and Central Banks," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-019, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US).
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2019-19
    DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2019.019
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    File URL: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2019019pap.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central bank independence ; Countercyclical capital buffer ; Financial stability committees ; Macroprudential policy;

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • H19 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Other
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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