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The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve

Author

Listed:
  • Peter Conti-Brown

    (University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

The independence of the Federal Reserve is considered a cornerstone of its identity, crucial for keeping monetary policy decisions free of electoral politics. But do we really understand what is meant by "Federal Reserve independence"? Using scores of examples from the Fed's rich history, The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve shows that much common wisdom about the nation's central bank is inaccurate. Legal scholar and financial historian Peter Conti-Brown provides an in-depth look at the Fed's place in government, its internal governance structure, and its relationships to such individuals and groups as the president, Congress, economists, and bankers. Exploring how the Fed regulates the global economy and handles its own internal politics, and how the law does—and does not—define the Fed's power, Conti-Brown captures and clarifies the central bank's defining complexities. He examines the foundations of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which established a system of central banks, and the ways that subsequent generations have redefined the organization. Challenging the notion that the Fed Chair controls the organization as an all-powerful technocrat, he explains how institutions and individuals—within and outside of government—shape Fed policy. Conti-Brown demonstrates that the evolving mission of the Fed—including systemic risk regulation, wider bank supervision, and as a guardian against inflation and deflation—requires a reevaluation of the very way the nation's central bank is structured. Investigating how the Fed influences and is influenced by ideologies, personalities, law, and history, The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve offers a clear picture of this uniquely important institution.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Conti-Brown, 2016. "The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10576.
  • Handle: RePEc:pup:pbooks:10576
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Donato Masciandaro, 2016. "More than the Human Appendix: Fed Capital and Central Bank Financial Independence," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1635, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    2. Charles Goodhart & Rosa Lastra, 2018. "Populism and Central Bank Independence," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 49-68, February.
    3. Badinger, Harald & Nitsch, Volker, 2019. "What Do Central Bankers Do? Evidence from the European Central Bank's Executive Board," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 277, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    4. Jeffrey C. Fuhrer & Giovanni P. Olivei & Eric Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 2018. "Should the Fed regularly evaluate its monetary policy framework?," Working Papers 18-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    5. Jeff Fuhrer & Giovanni P. Olivei & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, 2018. "Should the Federal Reserve Regularly Evaluate Its Monetary Policy Framework?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 49(2 (Fall)), pages 443-517.
    6. Mabbett, Deborah & Schelkle, Waltraud, 2019. "Independent or lonely? Central banking in crisis," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90879, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Peter J. Boettke & Alexander W. Salter & Daniel J. Smith, 2018. "Money as meta-rule: Buchanan’s constitutional economics as a foundation for monetary stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 529-555, September.
    8. Marijn van der Sluis, 2022. "National central banks in EMU: time for revision?," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(1), pages 19-30, March.
    9. Thomas F. Cargill & Gerald P. O’Driscoll Jr., 2018. "The Federal Reserve in the Shadow of the Bank of Japan," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 33(Spring 20), pages 47-62.
    10. Jan C. van Ours, 2022. "How Retirement Affects Mental Health, Cognitive Skills and Mortality; an Overview of Recent Empirical Evidence," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 22-050/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    11. Cargill, Thomas F. & Pingle, Mark, 2019. "Federal Reserve policy and housing: A goal too far," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 150-158.
    12. Omarova, Saule T. & Library, Cornell, 2018. "Central Banks, Systemic Risk and Financial Sector Structural Reform," LawArXiv hy8gt, Center for Open Science.
    13. Murau, Steffen & Haas, Armin & Guter-Sandu, Andrei, 2022. "Monetary Architecture and the Green Transition," SocArXiv sw5tu, Center for Open Science.
    14. Ohlrogge, Michael, 2022. "Financial Crises and Legislation," Journal of Financial Crises, Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS), vol. 4(3), pages 1-59, April.
    15. Alexander W. Salter & Daniel J. Smith, 2017. "What You Don'T Know Can Hurt You: Knowledge Problems In Monetary Policy," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 505-517, July.
    16. Thomas L. Hogan, Daniel J. Smith, Robin Aguiar-Hicks, 2018. "Central Banking without Romance," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 15(2), pages 293-314, December.
    17. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2017. "The Decentralized Central Bank: A Review Essay on The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve by Peter Conti-Brown," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(2), pages 621-636, June.
    18. Michael D. Bordo & Edward Simpson Prescott, 2023. "Federal Reserve Structure and the Production of Monetary Policy Ideas," Working Papers 23-29, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    19. Édgar González López (Director), 2017. "El ecosistema digital y las autoridades de regulación de los sectores audiovisual y TIC," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 948, March.
    20. Cargill, Thomas, 2016. "The Myth of Central Bank Independence," Working Papers 06813, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    21. Conti-Brown, Peter, 2022. "The Federal Reserve System: Diversity and Governance," Journal of Financial Crises, Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS), vol. 4(4), pages 1-46, April.
    22. Michael D. Bordo & Edward S. Prescott, 2019. "Federal Reserve Structure, Economic Ideas, and Monetary and Financial Policy," NBER Working Papers 26098, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Martin F. Hellwig, 2024. "National central banks and the governance of the European system of central banks," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2024_07, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    24. Rochelle M. Edge & J. Nellie Liang, 2019. "New Financial Stability Governance Structures and Central Banks," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-019, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    25. Louis Larue & Camille Meyer & Marek Hudon & Joakim Sandberg, 2022. "The Ethics of Alternative Currencies," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/341622, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

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