IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ekd/006356/6685.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Grease or sand the wheel? The effects of individual bribe payments on aggregate productivity growth

Author

Listed:
  • Julien Hanoteau
  • Virginie Vial

Abstract

While the Asian Paradox literature evidences a grease-the-wheel effect of corruption on individual firm productivity growth, the results call into question the aggregate effect of individual bribery. A large literature analyzes the drivers of productivity growth at the firm and sector levels, and suggests that corruption may affect these drivers through the resulting less favorable conditions for investment and technological progress, as well as distortions and misallocation in output and inputs markets. We are not aware of any literature that investigate the effects of micro-level corruption on aggregate productivity growth (APG) and its different components (intra-plant productivity growth; market shares reallocation between incumbents; and the effect of firm entry and exit in the industry). Filling this gap is important for understanding the dynamics by which corruption damages countries’ economic performance (Dal Bo and Rossi 2007) as measured by its main driver: productivity growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2003). Using a unique panel dataset covering the population of Indonesian manufacturing establishments over the long period 1975-1995, we assess the cumulated effect of micro-bribe payments to aggregate productivity growth. Following Foster et al. (2001) methodology so as to model and decompose Aggregate Labour Productivity Growth (ALPG), and using establishment-level measures of productivity and bribe payments, we assess the contribution of three different corruption-classes of plants: plants paying zero, low, or high bribes. As a robustness check, and to account for the overestimation of the net entry effect, we use the Melitz and Polanec (2012) modeling approach that is a dynamic version of Olley and Pakes (1996).We demonstrate that the aggregate class of high-corruption plants contributes negatively to aggregate labour productivity growth, while the aggregate class of plants paying zero or low bribes contributes positively. Our results are robust to the use of two different measures of corruption. Thus, this paper shows that the two diverging effects of corruption, that is the grease- and the sand-the-wheel effects, coexist at different aggregation levels and for different classes of plants. While corruption has beneficial effects if kept low, the cost of high corruption in terms of aggregate productivity growth becomes evident.

Suggested Citation

  • Julien Hanoteau & Virginie Vial, 2014. "Grease or sand the wheel? The effects of individual bribe payments on aggregate productivity growth," EcoMod2014 6685, EcoMod.
  • Handle: RePEc:ekd:006356:6685
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ecomod.net/system/files/Hanoteau%20Vial%202014%20ECOMOD%20Corruption%20Growth%20Indonesia.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. McCleary, Rachel & Barro, Robert, 2003. "Religion and Economic Growth across Countries," Scholarly Articles 3708464, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    2. Marc J. Melitz & Sašo Polanec, 2015. "Dynamic Olley-Pakes productivity decomposition with entry and exit," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 362-375, June.
    3. Philippe Aghion & Nick Bloom & Richard Blundell & Rachel Griffith & Peter Howitt, 2005. "Competition and Innovation: an Inverted-U Relationship," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(2), pages 701-728.
    4. Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Regulation of Entry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37.
    5. de Wit, Gerrit, 2005. "Firm size distributions: An overview of steady-state distributions resulting from firm dynamics models," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(5-6), pages 423-450, June.
    6. S.K. Bhutani, 2009. "China and India," India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, , vol. 65(4), pages 383-391, October.
    7. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1251-1288.
    8. Lorenzo Pellegrini & Reyer Gerlagh, 2004. "Corruption's Effect on Growth and its Transmission Channels," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 429-456, August.
    9. Ari Kuncoro, 2004. "Bribery in Indonesia: some evidence from micro-level data," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(3), pages 329-354.
    10. Shang-Jin Wei, 2000. "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 1-11, February.
    11. Alberto Alesina & Silvia Ardagna & Giuseppe Nicoletti & Fabio Schiantarelli, 2005. "Regulation And Investment," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(4), pages 791-825, June.
    12. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1991. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(2), pages 503-530.
    13. Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Weill, Laurent, 2010. "Is Corruption an Efficient Grease?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 244-259, March.
    14. Virginie Vial, 2006. "New Estimates Of Total Factor Productivity Growth In Indonesian Manufacturing," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(3), pages 357-369.
    15. Robert J. Barro & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2003. "Economic Growth, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262025531, February.
    16. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Peter J. Klenow, 2009. "Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 124(4), pages 1403-1448.
    17. repec:hrv:faseco:30747190 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Jun Du & Sourafel Girma, 2010. "Red Capitalists: Political Connections and Firm Performance in China," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 530-545, November.
    19. Dixit, Avinash K, 1989. "Entry and Exit Decisions under Uncertainty," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 620-638, June.
    20. Diego Restuccia & Richard Rogerson, 2008. "Policy Distortions and Aggregate Productivity with Heterogeneous Plants," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(4), pages 707-720, October.
    21. Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Khalid Sekkat, 2005. "Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(1), pages 69-97, January.
    22. Giuseppe Nicoletti & Stefano Scarpetta, 2003. "Regulation, productivity and growth: OECD evidence," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 18(36), pages 9-72, April.
    23. John McArthur & Francis Teal, 2002. "Corruption and firm performance in Africa," CSAE Working Paper Series 2002-10, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    24. Lucia Foster & John C. Haltiwanger & C. J. Krizan, 2001. "Aggregate Productivity Growth: Lessons from Microeconomic Evidence," NBER Chapters, in: New Developments in Productivity Analysis, pages 303-372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    25. Marcus Scheiblecker & et al., 2003. "Österreichs Wirtschaft im Jahr 2002: Neuerlich ungenügendes Wachstum," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 76(4), pages 257-323, April.
    26. Eric Bartelsman & John Haltiwanger & Stefano Scarpetta, 2013. "Cross-Country Differences in Productivity: The Role of Allocation and Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 305-334, February.
    27. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
    28. Beck, Paul J. & Maher, Michael W., 1986. "A comparison of bribery and bidding in thin markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-5.
    29. Robert J. Barro & Rachel McCleary, 2003. "Religion and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 9682, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    30. Olley, G Steven & Pakes, Ariel, 1996. "The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1263-1297, November.
    31. Behrman, Jere R & Deolalikar, Anil B, 1989. " . . Of the Fittest? Duration of Survival of Manufacturing Establishments in a Developing Country," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(2), pages 215-226, December.
    32. John Haltiwanger, 1997. "Measuring and analyzing aggregate fluctuations: the importance of building from microeconomic evidence," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 55-78.
    33. Baumol, William J., 1996. "Entrepreneurship: Productive, unproductive, and destructive," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 3-22, January.
    34. Rock, Michael T. & Bonnett, Heidi, 2004. "The Comparative Politics of Corruption: Accounting for the East Asian Paradox in Empirical Studies of Corruption, Growth and Investment," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 999-1017, June.
    35. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
    36. Robert J. Barro, 2003. "Determinants of Economic Growth in a Panel of Countries," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 4(2), pages 231-274, November.
    37. Peter Klenow & Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, 1997. "The Neoclassical Revival in Growth Economics: Has It Gone Too Far?," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997, Volume 12, pages 73-114, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    38. J. Vernon Henderson & Ari Kuncoro, 2004. "Corruption in Indonesia," NBER Working Papers 10674, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    39. Jens Arnold & Giuseppe Nicoletti & Stefano Scarpetta, 2008. "Regulation, Allocative Efficiency and Productivity in OECD Countries: Industry and Firm-Level Evidence," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 616, OECD Publishing.
    40. Francis Teal & John McArthur, 2002. "Corruption and Firm Performance in Africa," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2002-10, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    41. KWON Hyeog Ug & NARITA Futoshi & NARITA Machiko, 2009. "Resource Reallocation and Zombie Lending in Japan in the '90s," Discussion papers 09052, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    42. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
    43. Dearmon, Jacob & Grier, Kevin, 2009. "Trust and development," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 210-220, August.
    44. Vial, Virginie & Hanoteau, Julien, 2010. "Corruption, Manufacturing Plant Growth, and the Asian Paradox: Indonesian Evidence," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 693-705, May.
    45. Klapper, Leora & Laeven, Luc & Rajan, Raghuram, 2006. "Entry regulation as a barrier to entrepreneurship," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 591-629, December.
    46. Xavier Sala-i-Martín & Elsa V. Artadi, 2003. "Economic growth and investment in the Arab world," Economics Working Papers 683, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Indonesia; Growth; Developing countries;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ekd:006356:6685. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Theresa Leary). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ecomoea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.