Corruption and Firm Performance in Africa
This paper uses survey data to investigate empirically the importance of corruption in determining firm performance in Africa. We allow for the possibility of perception bias on the part of the respondents and for corruption being endogenous. We find that corruption is linked to significant adverse effects on firm performance in two ways. At the firm (or “local”) level, companies that pay bribes have 20 percent lower levels of output per worker. At the economywide (or “global”) level, firms in countries with pervasive corruption are some 70 per cent less efficient than firms in countries free of corruption. We thus provide evidence that competitive uncoordinated local corruption has substantial global effects.
|Date of creation:||01 Dec 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nickell, S.J., 1993.
"Competition and Crporate Performance,"
Economics Series Working Papers
99155, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Easterly, W & Levine, R, 1996.
"Africa's Growth Tragedy : Policies and Ethnic Divisions,"
536, Harvard - Institute for International Development.
- repec:tpr:qjecon:v:106:y:1991:i:2:p:407-43 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:tpr:qjecon:v:114:y:1999:i:1:p:83-116 is not listed on IDEAS
- Barro, R.J., 1989.
"Economic Growth In A Cross Section Of Countries,"
RCER Working Papers
201, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Davidson, Russell & MacKinnon, James G., 1993. "Estimation and Inference in Econometrics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195060119, July.
- Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999.
"Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?,"
NBER Working Papers
6564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- repec:tpr:qjecon:v:110:y:1995:i:3:p:681-712 is not listed on IDEAS
- Friedman, Eric & Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 2000. "Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 459-493, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:wps/2002-10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Monica Birds)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.