When workers share in profits: effort and responses to shirking
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- Richard B. Freeman, 2007. "When Workers Share in Profits: Effort and Responses to Shirking," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 97(6), pages 9-36, November-.
- Richard B. Freeman, 2008. "When Workers Share in Profits: Effort and Responses to Shirking," 'Angelo Costa' Lectures Serie, SIPI Spa, issue Lect. IX.
- Richard Freeman, 2008. "When Workers Share in Profits: Effort and Responses to Shirking," CEP Discussion Papers dp0882, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- David Hummels & Jakob Munch & Chong Xiang, 2016.
"No Pain, No Gain: The Effects of Exports on Effort, Injury, and Illness,"
NBER Working Papers
22365, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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More about this item
KeywordsProfit sharing; efficiency wages;
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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